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I. INTRODUCTION
Even though arbitration is a key process that ensures the enforcement
of investor’s rights, it cannot remain the main process for addressing all
types of investor-State disputes.1 I cannot help but think of the many
schools, hospitals, or roads that could have been built with the millions or
billions that now have to be paid for arbitration awards had governments
not violated their obligations under treaties.2
Having grown up in the Latin American region, I am well aware of the
endless and imminent needs of the most vulnerable populations.3 I vividly
remember the time someone said that Latin America was the “world cham-
1. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and
Alternatives to Arbitration II (Susan D. Franck & Anna Joubin-Bret, eds.), U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/
WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/8 (2011), https://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20108_en.pdf [hereinafter
Prevention and Alternatives II].
2. See, e.g., Enrique Jaramillo, 2019 in Review: Latin America and Investment Arbitration,
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Jan. 17, 2020), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/01/17/
2019-in-review-latin-america-and-investment-arbitration. See also Investment Dispute Settlement
Navigator, INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/
cases/317/perenco-v-ecuador (last visited Dec. 4, 2020).
3. See, e.g., RENOS VAKIS, JAMELE RIGOLINI & LEONARDO LUCCHETTI, LEFT BEHIND:
CHRONIC POVERTY IN LATIN AMERICA (2015), https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/World
bank/document/LAC/chronic_poverty_overview.pdf.
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pion” in the number of investor-State disputes.4 Since then, I have been
trying to figure out what it would take for Latin America to become the
“world champion” in investment retention and expansion. Clearly, political
stability is indispensable as well as fertile ground for investment to flour-
ish.5 As much as that is necessary, it is not sufficient to retain and expand
foreign direct investment (FDI).6
My work has largely focused on developing channels for effective par-
ticipation in the public square in Latin America.7 However, Professor Susan
Franck8 made me realize that without FDI, even with the most advanced
democracies, Latin American countries might still struggle financially.9 The
4. See Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps. [ICSID], The ICSID Caseload—Statistics
(2020-2), at 12 (2020), https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/The%20ICSID
%20Caseload%20Statistics%20%282020-2%20Edition%29%20ENG.pdf.
5. See Anabel Gonzalez, Christine Zhenwei Qiang & Peter Kusek, Overview, in GLOBAL
INVESTMENT COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 1, 12 (2017–18), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/
240611508856688243/GICR-00-Overview.pdf (“According to the Global Investment Competi-
tiveness (GIC) survey political stability and a business-friendly regulatory environment are most
important in investors’ decision making.”).
6. See generally Mariana Hernandez Crespo G., A New Chapter in Natural Resource-Seek-
ing Investment: Using Shared Decisions System Design (“SDSD”) to Strengthen Investor-State
and Community Relationships, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 551 (2017) (arguing that political
stability is not enough to retain and expand investment and processes for public consultation need
to be expanded to include other participatory processes that include the communities after the
investor has started operations).
7. See generally Mariana Hernandez Crespo, Building the Latin America We Want: Supple-
menting Representative Democracies with Consensus Building, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
425 (2008) (discussing how representative democracies could be supplemented with consensus
building in the Latin American region to enhance political stability); Mariana Hernandez Crespo
G., From Noise to Music: The Potential of the Multi-door Courthouse (Casas de Justicia) Model
to Advance Systemic Inclusion and Participation as a Foundation for Sustainable Rule of Law in
Latin America, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 335 (suggesting how Houses of Justice could be used for
collaborative governance).
8. Professor Susan Franck realized that the world of investment was missing the critical
body of knowledge that has been developed in the dispute resolution field over the past four
decades in the United States. To address this, she brought together experts of both fields at the
conference at Washington and Lee School of Law. The ideas generated were memorialized in a
U.N. publication. It could be argued that this marked the beginning of dispute system design and
conflict management in FDI. See generally, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/
2009/11, U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.11 (2010), https://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf
[hereinafter ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION]; Prevention and Alternatives II, supra note 1; U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: UNCTAD Series on
Issues in International Investment Agreements II, a Sequel, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2013/2
(2014), https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaeia2013d2_en.pdf. See generally 1 TRANS-
NAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2014), https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/journal-browse-
issues-toc.asp?key=52.
9. For example, Costa Rica is one of the most stable democracies in the world; however,
without FDI, it would not likely have the economic prosperity that it enjoys. See INT’L INST. FOR
DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, THE GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2019: ADDRESS-
ING THE ILLS, REVIVING THE PROMISE 118 (2019), https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publica-
tions/the-global-state-of-democracy-2019.pdf (noting that of the top five countries in the world
with the highest levels of Representative Government, three (Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay) are
in Latin America); Steve Colantuoni, The Importance of Foreign Direct Investment in Costa Rica,
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question then became, what does Latin America need to do to retain and
expand its foreign investments?
From Resolving Disputes to Preserving Relationships: Power,
Rights, and Interests
To understand where we are today, we must look at how it all started.
When foreign direct investors went around the globe and had problems with
host governments, without systems in place to resolve disputes, the inves-
tors often resorted to gunshot diplomacy or diplomatic espousal.10 This ex-
treme, power-based system to resolve disputes was not sustainable.11 It
gave birth to bilateral treaties that aimed to protect investors through a
rights-based system, enforced through arbitration.12 Since then, the world of
FDI has been operating under the assumption that host countries may pose
significant risks to foreign investors.13 Investors feel compelled to protect
their investments from any “adverse consequences of social, economic, or
political instability in the host country.”14
However, an investor’s drive for self-preservation could gradually de-
crease in order to grow a flourishing business relationship with the host
country. This defense mechanism with its focus on self-preservation stems
from self-interest, but relationships require incorporating the interests of all
to increase synergies. As I have emphasized in my previous work,
Of central importance is expanding the notion of self-interest
from that of “I” (the individual) to that of “we” (the collective).
Investors might benefit long-term if they thought less in terms of
strictly protecting investments (individual interests) and more in
terms of promoting the best interest of the investor-State business
relationship (joint gains). The expansion of this paradigm—from
“I” to “we”—could open opportunities until now unimagined.15
In this way, individual potential is maximized, and risk is minimized,
because when the parties experience a higher level of unity, they each be-
come an integral part of the relationship. Therefore, they are less likely to
work in opposition to the other.16
CENTRAL AM. GRP. (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.thecentralamericangroup.com/foreign-direct-in-
vestment-in-costa-rica.
10. See, e.g., Mariana Hernandez Crespo, From Paper to People: Building Conflict Resolu-
tion Capacity and Frameworks for Sustainable Implementation of IIAs to Increase Investor-State
Satisfaction, in Prevention and Alternatives II, supra note 1, at 56 (discussing the historical pro-
gression of dispute resolution and its impact on the investor-State business relationship).
11. Id. at 55.
12. Id. at 56.
13. Id. at 56–57.
14. Id. at 56.
15. Id. at 55.
16. Mariana Hernandez-Crespo Gonstead, Remedy Without Diagnosis: How to Optimize Re-
sults by Leveraging the Appropriate Dispute Resolution and Shared Decision-Making Process, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 2165, 2214–18 (2020).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-2\UST204.txt unknown Seq: 6  8-JUN-21 9:46
256 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:2
From Protecting Rights to Generating Synergies: Conflict Management
and Intercultural Capacities
This article aims to be a “paper of papers” in which I synthesize my
work. Over the years I have developed, tested, and implemented
frameworks and tools to strengthen the investor-State business relationship.
This article explains why it is necessary to expand the goal from mainly
securing investment and resolving and preventing disputes to developing a
conflict management framework (conflict management mechanisms, or
CMMs)17 and intercultural capacities18 to retain and expand foreign invest-
ment. It suggests that unless investors, host governments, and communities
work as indispensable partners, they may be unable to reach higher levels of
innovation and growth.
The time has come to unlock the potential of the investor-State busi-
ness relationship. Engaging with each other in a dynamic and vibrant part-
nership requires (1) a shift in mindset, from playing defense to playing as a
team, (2) expanding goals, and (3) developing new strategies.
In order to change mindsets, section II of this article suggests ex-
panding the current goals of securing investment and preventing disputes, to
broader goals that focus on strengthening the investor-State business rela-
tionship to promote investment retention and expansion. To this end, it first
discusses the limits of a dispute-centered approach and the need to move to
a relationship-centered approach. Next, this section explores the systems
and processes required to address the escalation of differences, including
disagreements, grievances, and disputes, and the need to engage such differ-
ences “outside the conflict zone.”
To develop new strategies, section III first argues that the investor-
State business relationship—given its unique nature as a private-public,
cross-border, and long-term relationship—presents significant levels of
complexity. Among those challenges, culture is one of the most prominent.
For this reason, this section explores the different types of investment and
the distinct challenges that culture poses for each.
Section III then addresses these challenges by presenting a brief over-
view of a domestic framework for CMMs. The framework provides struc-
ture for coordination, implementation, opportunities for shared decision-
making, and if needed, problem-solving when issues arise.
17. Roberto Echandi, Complementing Investor-State Dispute Resolution: A Conceptual
Framework for Investor-State Conflict Management, in PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT LAW AND POLICY 270, 270–305 (Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2013) (introducing
the CMM framework); see also Roberto Echandi & Mariana Hernandez Crespo Gonstead, Inves-
tor-State Conflict Management, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
334, 337–38 (Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer eds., 2017).
18. Mariana Hernandez Crespo Gonstead, A New Dance on the Global Stage: Introducing a
Cultural Value-Based Toolbox to Optimize Problem-Solving, Innovation, and Growth, 34 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675, 716–33 (2019) (explaining the importance of culture in investor-State
relationships).
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Next, this section examines the intercultural capacities that must be
developed to optimize shared decision-making and problem-solving. To this
end, it introduces three sets of tools to minimize risk and maximize poten-
tial within the investor-State business relationship. The first set of tools
aims to enhance understanding, predictability, and engagement at the bar-
gaining table in processes such as negotiation, mediation, and consensus
building. The second set of tools aims to maximize efficiency and effective-
ness in process selection when conflict erupts. The third set of tools aims to
assess and improve the systems for conflict management and shared deci-
sion-making by examining what exists and designing what could be.
To visualize the relationship between the framework and the develop-
ment of intercultural capacities, this section uses the analogy of first build-
ing a swimming pool and then training the participants to swim.19 Together,
the framework and the development of intercultural capacities allow us to
maximize the potential of the investor-State partnership.
In sum, section IV concludes that unless we adopt a new mindset, set
broader goals to improve relationships, and develop new strategies to inter-
act more effectively, we may be unable to unlock the potential of the inves-
tor-State business relationship. If we continue to focus mainly on securing
investments and preventing and resolving disputes, the world may never see
what can be accomplished when foreign investors, governments, and local
communities come together as indispensable partners to promote innovation
and growth.
II. BROADENING THE GOAL: BEYOND PROTECTION OF RIGHTS TO
RETAIN AND EXPAND INVESTMENT
To move forward, we cannot continue focusing on how to resolve or
prevent investor-State disputes. There is simply too much at stake. We must
examine where we have been and where we are today in order to move
forward. This section first describes our current goals that focus on resolv-
ing and preventing investor-State disputes. It then suggests real progress
can be made by broadening goals and focusing on strengthening the busi-
ness relationship for investment retention and expansion.
19. See Gonstead, supra note 16, at 2175 (“[B]uilding channels in the public square is like
building swimming pools; although the pool is there for citizens to use, they need to learn how to
swim.”).
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TABLE 1: BROADENING THE GOAL
A. The Current Goal: Focusing on Securing Investment and Preventing
Investor-State Disputes
In the current global economy, companies routinely cross borders to
access resources or markets or to expand their competitive advantage. In
FDI, unlike in international trade, companies have to establish their opera-
tions in a host country. Navigating daily interactions in a foreign culture
and legal system poses significant challenges, but there are powerful incen-
tives for both the investor and the host country. For example, companies
expect to obtain financial benefits while host countries expect to increase
employment opportunities for their citizens, increase access to knowledge,
and gain financially.
It is in this context that the investor-State business relationship is of
critical importance. Unlike in international trade, which is transactional in
nature, allowing parties to easily change their course of business, in FDI,
de-coupling usually results in significant sunk cost for the investor, and
potential harm for the host economy.20 In addition, severing the relationship
poses a significant loss of business opportunity and could affect the reputa-
tions of both parties.21
1. Initial Efforts: Investment Treaties and Arbitration
Given the complexity of investor-State business partnerships, conflict
can quickly escalate into disputes at the international level. Historically,
investor-State disputes were resolved through gunshot diplomacy and diplo-
20. See Crespo, supra note 10, at 55.
21. See id.
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matic espousal until the introduction of bilateral investment treaties.22
These treaties were instrumental in securing investment by providing guar-
antees to foreign investors and a direct recourse through arbitration.
Treaties and arbitration expanded the framework for resolution from a
power-based system to a rules-based system, and alleviated concerns re-
garding the security of the investment. However, the arbitration process as
the main mechanism for the enforcement of rights is insufficient to retain
investment and preserve the relationship. Moreover, despite its increased
use, the arbitration process requires significant costs,23 and its relief is lim-
ited to legal remedies.24 For these reasons, leading experts, such as Susan
D. Franck, have suggested that instead of defaulting to investment treaty
arbitration for disputes arising under investment treaties, parties should con-
sider a variety of processes.25
While arbitration has been the predominant process selected to resolve
investor-State disputes, other methods, such as conciliation, have been used
for the past several decades.26 Furthermore, there is also evidence that par-
ties to arbitration tend to settle after the process has begun. A study by
Roberto Echandi and Priyanka Kher provides evidence that parties are ac-
tively seeking alternatives to arbitration that better meet their needs and
allow parties to control the outcome.27
2. Latest Developments: Mediation and Dispute Prevention
Recently, mediation has become more prominent among the options
available for resolving disputes in foreign investment at the international
and domestic level.28 The next generation of treaties have included media-
22. See, e.g., id.
23. See, e.g., SUSAN D. FRANCK, ARBITRATION COSTS: MYTHS AND REALITIES IN INVEST-
MENT TREATY ARBITRATION (2019).
24. Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, In-
vestor-State Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 138, 138–43, 146–47, 154–56 (2007)
(arguing that arbitration is insufficient to address the complex and unique nature of investor-State
disputes).
25. FRANCK, supra note 23, at 309–16 (2019) (suggesting a matrix of dispute resolution
options including two dimensions, informal/formal and adjudicative/non-adjudicative mecha-
nisms); see also Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems
Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 177–78, 181–84 (2007); Susan D. Franck, Challenges Facing
Investment Disputes: Reconsidering Dispute Resolution in International Investment Agreements,
in APPEALS MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 143, 143–92 (Karl P. Sauvant
ed., 2008).
26. Jack J. Coe Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Dis-
putes—a Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 7, 15–18 (2005) (discussing
strengths and weaknesses of the processes).
27. Roberto Echandi & Priyanka Kher, Can International Investor-State Disputes be Pre-
vented? Empirical Evidence from Settlements in ICSID Arbitration, 29 ICSID REV. 41, 63–65
(2014).
28. See, e.g., JACQUELINE NOLAN-HALEY, ELLEN E. DEASON & MARIANA HERNANDEZ-CRE-
SPO GONSTEAD, GLOBAL ISSUES IN MEDIATION 225–64 (2019) (providing an overview of the de-
velopment of mediation’s use in the context of FDI).
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tion, and this inclusion has signaled mediation’s legitimacy.29 Other signifi-
cant developments have also contributed to the consideration of mediation
as a viable option,30 such as UNCITRAL’s Convention on the Enforcement
of Mediation Settlements, and ICSID’s proposed Mediation Rules. Both
have contributed to the “legal infrastructure to support non-adjudicative
methods.”31
The International Bar Association (IBA) Investor-State Mediation
Rules were one of the most significant developments in international dis-
pute resolution.32 These rules provide a regulatory framework and intro-
duced opportunities to adapt the mediation process to reflect the parties’
preferences and increase their level of satisfaction with the process.33 The
rules offer guidelines for those unfamiliar with mediation, and a high level
of flexibility, enhancing the level of self-determination of the parties.34 For
example, Article 1 establishes that the parties can “exclude or vary any of
these rules at any time,” and Article 9 guidelines allow the parties to use
mediation management conferences as opportunities to address any proce-
dural issues.35
Process choice includes different mediation models,36 such as facilita-
tive, evaluative, and transformative mediation, among others. Parties can
also select co-mediators who share their cultural ties in order to enhance
understanding across cultures to increase the level of engagement and gen-
29. See, e.g., Frauke Nitschke, The ICSID Conciliation Rules in Practice, in MEDIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Catharine Titi & Katia Fach Gómez
eds.) (forthcoming) (discussing the importance of the specific reference to mediation in treaties
such as: EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Central American
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and Investment Agreement for the Common Investment Area of
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)).
30. See generally Anna Spain, Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of Interna-
tional Dispute Resolution, 32 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010).
31. FRANCK, supra note 23, at 11.




33. Barton Legum, Anna Joubin-Bret & Inna Manassyan, Rules for Investor-State Mediation:
Draft Prepared by the International Bar Association State Mediation Subcommittee, in PROSPECTS
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 265, 265 (Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauvé eds.,
2013); see also Susan D. Franck, Using Investor-State Mediation Rules to Promote Conflict Man-
agement: An Introductory Guide, 29 ICSID REV. 1, 66–89 (2014); Anna Joubin-Bret & Barton
Legum, A Set of Rules Dedicated to Investor-State Mediation: The IBA Investor-State Mediation
Rules, 29 ICSID REV. 1, 17–24 (2014).
34. See Anna Joubin-Bret, International Dispatch: Investor-State Disputes, 20 DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Fall 2013, at 37, 39–40 (discussing prominent features of the rules).
35. IBA Rules, supra note 32, at 2, 6.
36. See Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, Becoming “Investor-State Mediation,” 1
PA. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFFS. 86, 95–96 (2012) (arguing that the goals of the parties need to drive the
mediation model adopted).
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erate mutually satisfying options.37 These procedural choices can contribute
to the quality of the process and sustainability of the agreement.
In addition to mediation, there have been significant efforts oriented to
not only effectively resolving disputes between foreign investors and host
countries but also preventing disputes from arising. For example, among the
dispute prevention policies and best practices approaches, a United Nations
Council on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) publication lists the fol-
lowing: “Information sharing[;] Targeting sensitive sectors[;] Reinforcing
institutional and amicable procedures—administrative review[;] Implemen-
tation of ISDS commitments: access to information, inter-institutional ar-
rangements and authority to settle[;] Securing authority to negotiate and
settle—budgetary authority[;] Assessing the claim: making all relevant doc-
uments available to the lead agency at short notice[;] Institutional response:
ombuds and mediation services[;] State-State cooperation in dispute pre-
vention[;] The ability to settle during an arbitration procedure.”38
These approaches emphasize that “States would be better off anticipat-
ing possible sources of investor-State disputes in advance and taking neces-
sary action much earlier. In doing so, the difficulties and costs, including
political costs, involved by resorting to international arbitration or ADR
could be avoided entirely.”39 Yet, UNCTAD recognizes that using good
practices “does not imply that a State will be totally immune to any disputes
from occurring, but rather that it has taken concrete and positive steps to-
wards preventing conflict from arising and crystallizing into fully formed
disputes under a treaty.”40
B. The Broader Goal: Strengthening the Investor-State Business
Relationship for Investment Retention and Expansion
Having effective methods for dispute resolution, as well as dispute pre-
vention, is foundational to ensure fairness in a relationship. However, to
strengthen the relationship, rules and processes are not enough. Instead,
strengthening a relationship requires a deep understanding of who the par-
ties are. This section first explores the limits of a dispute-centered approach
and the need for a relationship-centered approach to integrate differences.
Next, it discusses the importance of engaging investor-State differences
outside the conflict zone in order to understand disagreements, grievances,
and disputes.
37. Gonstead, supra note 18, at 749–50 (emphasizing the critical role co-mediators can play
as cultural translators). See generally Rebecca Golbert, An Anthropologist’s Approach to Media-
tion, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 81, 86–88 (2009) (emphasizing the role of culture on how
we approach conflict, the role of the mediator, and the different expectations regarding neutrality).
38. ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 65–97.
39. Id. at 65.
40. Id. at 65–66.
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1. Limits of a Dispute-Centered Approach: The Need for a
Relationship-Centered Approach to Integrate Differences
Even when disputes are resolved or prevented through rights, investors
may still leave. Treaties and arbitration as a recourse are necessary but not
sufficient to prevent divestment and propel investment retention and expan-
sion.41 Because of the relational nature of FDI, framing issues in terms of
rights and adjudicating them through arbitration harms or ends the business
relationship.42
Jeswald Salacuse has stressed that
underlying the dispute is an intended long-term investment rela-
tionship: A complex connection, often amounting to a state of
interdependence, between the investor and the host country. In
cases of privatization of public services, such as water, gas, or
telecommunications, the investor and the host country are linked
in a more or less permanent relationship that is very difficult to
unravel, far more difficult than that arising out of a simple con-
tract of sale of a commodity in international commerce.43
A focus on dispute resolution or prevention reinforces the mindset of
protecting individual interests in order to secure investments. This defense
mechanism can affect the development of a vibrant business relationship.
Instead, parties could gradually lower their guards to start the process of
integrating the interests of all, thereby sparking synergies. When parties
move from an individual to a collective mindset, from “I” to “we,” it maxi-
mizes potential and minimizes risk because the parties increase the level of
unity.44 They begin perceiving themselves as an integral part of the whole
and are then less likely to act in opposition to the other.
To move forward, we need to move from a defensive posture that fo-
cuses on dispute resolution and prevention and expand to a proactive, rela-
tionship-centered approach that maximizes joint gains. Adopting a
relationship-centered approach can shift the paradigm from the mindset of
protection to cooperation, from a focus on individual positions to a focus on
collective interests, from mainly enforcing a “Bill of Economic Rights” to
maximizing joint gains, and from securing investment to strengthening the
investor-State business relationship45 to reach higher levels of investment
retention and expansion.
41. Roberto Echandi, The Blind Side of International Investment Law and Policy: The Need
for Investor-State Conflict Management Mechanisms Fostering Investment Retention and Expan-
sion, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. (Nov. 2, 2020), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2018/10/
No-290-Echandi-FINAL.pdf.
42. Crespo, supra note 10, at 55.
43. Salacuse, supra note 24, at 138–43, 146–47, 154–56.
44. Crespo, supra note 10, at 56.
45. Id. at 57.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-2\UST204.txt unknown Seq: 13  8-JUN-21 9:46
2021] BEYOND INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES 263
2. Engaging Investor-State Differences Outside the Conflict Zone:
Understanding Disagreements, Grievances, and Disputes
A focus on strengthening investor-State business relationships requires
engaging investor-State differences outside the conflict zone. To do so, we
must understand how differences can escalate through disagreements, griev-
ances, and disputes. Each of these stages require a specific system and pro-
cess to effectively address differences.
A relationship-centered approach is at the core of the World Bank’s
work in assisting host countries to retain and expand investment.46 The goal
of that work focuses on conflict management that goes beyond avoiding
arbitration and instead aims to prevent divestment.47 A dispute-centered ap-
proach is insufficient48 because ultimately, we want to address differences
outside the conflict zone.
When foreign investors establish operations in a host country, they
likely are entering into a long-term business relationship. In any relation-
ship, the question is not if there will be disagreements, but when. Long-term
relationships49 require planning for addressing differences, which can esca-
late from informal disagreements to more formal grievances and disputes.
The following table, previously published,50 shows how each level of dif-
ferences corresponds to a particular stage and particular processes, focuses,
and foundations.
46. Echandi, supra note 41.
47. Roberto Echandi, Proof of Concept: Pilots Fostering Greater Retention and Expansion of
FDI (FDI) by Enabling Governments to Early Address Investor-State Grievances (forthcoming)
(on file with author).
48. Roberto Echandi, Investor-State Conflict Management: A Preliminary Sketch, 1 TRANS-
NAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2014), https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=
2083.
49. JOHN ASHCROFT, ROY CHILDS, ALISON MYERS & MICHAEL SCHLUTER, THE RELATIONAL
LENS: UNDERSTANDING, MANAGING AND MEASURING STAKEHOLDER RELATIONSHIPS 4–6 (2016)
(stressing that a relationship is more than practical results and is instead an integral part of the
parties’ unique reality).
50. Gonstead, supra note 18, at 745.
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TABLE 2. THE ESCALATION OF DIFFERENCES
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Mariana H.C. Gonstead, Part of the Cultural Value-Based Toolbox 
For a relationship-centered approach, the disagreement stage is partic-
ularly relevant. This stage is early and informal and allows the parties to
determine the appropriate level of participation (information sharing, con-
sultation, or negotiation) in the decision-making process. To facilitate this
discernment, I have conceptualized an analytical framework, which I have
termed Shared Decisions System Design (SDSD).51
The focus at the disagreement stage is on understanding the other as
part of the whole. At this stage the foundation requires learning about the
parties: what they want (positions), why they want it (interests),52 and why
it is important to them (values).53 By increasing understanding and engag-
ing differences at an early stage (outside the conflict zone), parties are bet-
ter able to capitalize on their differences.54
Grievances are a more advanced stage where the disagreement is for-
malized but has not yet escalated into a legal dispute. The system for reso-
lution at the grievance level is called appropriate grievance management or
conflict management.55 The processes range from facilitative to hybrid to
51. Crespo G., supra note 6, at 556, 574–75, 580–81, 584, 618–19.
52. See generally ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM L. URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (3d ed. 2011).
53. See Gonstead, supra note 18, at 716–23.
54. Gonstead, supra note 16, at 2213–21 (arguing that differences can be used to spark ongo-
ing synergies).
55. Echandi, supra note 41.
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adjudicative. Even though there is already a conflict centered around a par-
ticular issue instead of a decision to be made, the focus is still relational. At
this stage the foundation is still made up of interests and values, but rights
may also be considered.56
When differences have escalated to the dispute stage, the appropriate
system for resolution is investor-State dispute settlement.57 The three
processes are facilitative, hybrids, and adjudicative. Generally, the focus is
no longer on the relationship but rather on resolving the issue at hand.
While the foundation remains interests, values, and rights,58 rights tend to
prevail given the legal nature of the dispute.
As discussed in this section, to strengthen the investor-State business
relationship, parties must move beyond securing investment and preventing
investor-State disputes. To broaden the goal, parties could adopt a relation-
ship-centered approach that engages parties’ differences at the disagreement
and grievance level—before they become legal disputes. To this end, the
next section introduces strategies at the domestic level to facilitate this shift.
III. INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES: CULTURAL CHALLENGES, A DOMESTIC
FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND
INTERCULTURAL CAPACITY BUILDING
Focusing on the business relationship, this section first examines the
challenges that culture poses to different types of investment. Second, this
section presents a domestic framework for conflict management mecha-
nisms (CMMs). Third, this section introduces the intercultural skills to opti-
mize shared decision-making and problem-solving. The relationship
between CMMs and intercultural capacities is fundamental. To understand
their connection, one can visualize the CMMs framework as a swimming
pool and the intercultural capacities as the ability to swim.
The CMMs framework (swimming pool) provides the structure for co-
ordination, implementation, and opportunities to have more effective and
efficient interactions between the investor and the host country. Operating
within the CMMs framework requires the development of intercultural ca-
pacities (the ability to swim). These capacities allow parties to effectively
interact when conflict erupts, when bargaining at the table, and when as-
sessing and improving systems for conflict management and shared deci-
56. The grievance mechanisms are considered part of the problem-solving stage in CMMs.
See Echandi & Gonstead, supra note 17, at 337–38.
57. See Roberto Echandi, Investor-State Dispute Prevention: A Conceptual Framework
(NCCR Trade, Working Paper No. 2011/46), https://www.wti.org/research/publications/245/in-
vestor-state-dispute-prevention-a-conceptual-framework (emphasizing the importance of distin-
guishing between conflict and disputes).
58. WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES RE-
SOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 3–19 (1st ed. 1988) (discussing
three alternatives to deal with conflict: powers, rights, and interests).
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sion-making. These intercultural capacities can enhance engagement,
understanding, and predictability, thereby increasing effectiveness and effi-
ciency in investor-State business interactions.
TABLE 3. INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES: CULTURAL CHALLENGES, A DOMESTIC
FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (CMMS), AND
INTERCULTURAL CAPACITY BUILDING
A. Challenges for the Investor-State Relationship: The Impact of
Culture on Different Types of Investment
Culture plays a critical role in the ever-important investor-State busi-
ness relationship. Investor-State business relationships are unique given the
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private-public, cross-border, and long-term nature.59 It is in this context that
culture can become a barrier to the relationship or provide the necessary
leverage in fostering the business partnership.
For the purpose of this article, culture is defined as “the tacit social
order of an organization: It shapes attitudes and behaviors in wide-ranging
and durable ways. Cultural norms define what is encouraged, discouraged,
accepted, or rejected within a group.”60 Incorporating cultural differences
enables partners to work together in a more efficient and effective way.61
Furthermore, culture is a critical factor that allows leaders to maximize
gains while minimizing risks.62 A Harvard Business Review article empha-
sizes that the failure to understand the impact of culture can derail the best-
laid plans.63 By developing the capacity to integrate cultural differences,
host countries may improve their investment climates,64 and foreign compa-
nies may improve their reputations as attractive investors.
When we discuss FDI, it is critical to distinguish the four types of
investment: (1) natural resource-seeking, (2) domestic market-seeking, (3)
efficiency-seeking, and (4) strategic asset-seeking.65 Each of these poses
distinct opportunities but also presents challenges,66 especially in the cul-
tural realm, because of the complexities of navigating cultural differences.
1. Natural Resource-Seeking Investment: The Challenges of
Engaging with Communities
As its name suggests, natural resource-seeking investment is the prac-
tice of searching out natural resources such as oil or minerals that either
cannot be found in the investor’s home country or can be found somewhere
59. See generally Salacuse, supra note 24.
60. Boris Groysberg, Jeremiah Lee, Jesse Price & J. Yo-Jud Cheng, The Leader’s Guide to
Corporate Culture, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2018, at 44, 46.
61. FONS TROMPENAARS & CHARLES HAMPDEN-TURNER, RIDING THE WAVES OF CULTURE
7–8 (2d. ed. 1998) (discussing the different levels of culture: national, corporate, and
professional).
62. Groysberg et al., supra note 60, at 46.
63. Id.
64. See World Bank Grp. [WBG], Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017/2018:
Foreign Investor Perspectives and Policy Implications, at 5 (2018), https://openknowl-
edge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/28493/9781464811753.pdf.
65. See generally John Dunning, Toward an Eclectic Theory of International Production:
Some Empirical Tests, 11 J. INT’L BUS. STUDIES 9 (1980). See also JOHN DUNNING & SARIANNA
M. LUNDAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 63–73 (2d ed. 2008);
Echandi, supra note 47 (applying Dunning’s framework to investment retention).
66. For challenges associated with each type of FDI, see Roberto Echandi, Connecting the
Dots Between International Trade and Investment Regulation, Investment Climate Reform and
Development: The World Bank’s Investment Reform Map, in CURRENT ISSUES IN ASIA PACIFIC
FDI 31, 31–53 (Austl. APEC Study Centre ed., 2015). See also World Bank Group, Investment
Policy and Promotion Diagnostics & Tools, at 42 (2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/666341500008847215/pdf/117475-PUBLIC-WP-13-7-2017-12-8-30-SPIRATool-
KitGuide.pdf [hereinafter Policy and Promotion].
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else at a lower cost or more accessibly.67 Dating back to colonialism, there
have been significant political and economic challenges with regard to natu-
ral resources.68 For this reason, this type of investment is one of the most
politically charged. Investors may also face challenges including distribut-
ing gains at the subnational and national levels and concerns related to envi-
ronmental impact, labor rights, and possible civil conflicts.69
Despite these challenges, both investors and States continue to seek
business relationships because of the potential benefits of their collabora-
tion. Natural resource-seeking investment is the type with the most incen-
tives70 for the host State and the investor to work together with the local
community because this type of investment is limited to where the re-
sources are located.
In natural resource-seeking investment, the cultural challenge
manifests most prominently when investors interact with the local commu-
nity. While including the community complicates the investor-State rela-
tionship, it also presents enormous potential71 for collaboration and
participation among stakeholders.72 To this end, foreign investors must ef-
fectively interact with the culture of the local community. If they do not,
operations could be paralyzed because of power dynamics exasperated by
cultural differences.73
More often than not, investors find themselves in rural areas with very
little government presence.74 This is a significant issue that cannot be over-
looked. However, even if there is government presence, the cultural differ-
ences between investors and communities should be properly addressed
throughout the life of the investment.75
Acknowledging the culture of the community and incorporating the
community’s interests and values can lead to higher levels of engagement
that can in turn lead to unprecedented synergies.76 By understanding the
culture in which it is operating, the investor can work with the local com-
67. Echandi, supra note 66, at 43; see also Policy and Promotion, supra note 66, at 9.
68. Echandi, supra note 66, at 43.
69. Id.
70. Crespo G., supra note 6, at 553.
71. Id.
72. JEANNE M. BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY 177–202 (2001) (articulating the complexity
when governments are at the bargaining table).
73. Crespo G., supra note 6, at 576–79.
74. See generally id. (arguing that collaborative governance can help fill the void when there
is a weak government presence in rural areas).
75. See Gonstead, supra note 18, at 735–37.
76. See Mariana Hernandez Crespo, From Problem to Potential, in POVERTY AND THE INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC LEGAL SYSTEM: DUTIES TO THE WORLD’S POOR 225, 225 (Krista
Nadakavukaren Schefer ed., 2013).
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munity to problem-solve and reveal long-term solutions that maximize the
wellbeing of all.77
2. Market-Seeking Investment: Underestimating Cultural Values of
Target Markets
In market-seeking investment, investors aim to increase financial gains
by accessing new markets.78 The members of a host country benefit from
the access to new goods and services and higher-paying jobs. The domestic
economy benefits from added competition with the addition of “interna-
tional business practices, standards, know-how and technology” that the in-
vestors bring.79
Because the goal of market-seeking investment is not to generate ex-
ports,80 it creates competition with the domestic market. The domestic busi-
ness sector is the interest group most affected and therefore may create the
most resistance to this type of investment.81 Despite this challenge, inves-
tors have a high level of motivation and a need to understand the culture of
the host country in order to effectively penetrate the market and compete
for market share.
The cultural challenge in market-seeking investment is significantly
greater than in natural resource-seeking investment. In market-seeking in-
vestment, the investor is not interacting with a particular community but
instead might be selling its products to a broader and more diverse target
population. To provide the appropriate goods and services, the investor
seeks to understand the culture of the populace including their language,
traditions, and behaviors. Without true understanding, the investor may risk
significant financial losses and may even destroy any potential for a rela-
tionship with its target consumers.82
An example that illustrates the level of sophistication required and the
cost of underestimating culture is the failure by Dolce & Gabbana to launch
its “Dolce loves China” campaign.83 The company produced videos that
Chinese consumers found shocking.84 It erred by producing a humorous
77. See generally id. (arguing that local communities could be an asset rather than a liability
in the FDI context).
78. DUNNING & LUNDAN, supra note 65, at 69–71.
79. Echandi, supra note 66, at 47.
80. Policy and Promotion, supra note 66, at 9.
81. Id. at 12.
82. See Gonstead, supra note 18, at 737–40.
83. See id. at 681–83.
84. Adam Jourdan & Pei Li, Dolce & Gabbana Cancels Shanghai Show After “Chopsticks”
Ad Causes Uproar, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2018, 4:28 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dolce-
gabbana-china/dolce-gabbana-cancels-shanghai-show-after-chopsticks-ad-causes-uproar-
idUSKCN1NQ162.
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campaign that overlooked the deeply held value of Chinese patriotism.85
This failure by the investor to understand the culture of its target market
resulted in significant damage to its bottom line.86
Market-seeking investment requires a deep understanding of the risk
involved with navigating a new culture. Without the correct cultural inter-
pretation, the investor may fail to adapt its products or services to meet the
expectations of the target market, or may adapt them but in an ineffective
way.87 To develop a cultural strategy that reflects the values of the target
market, an investor must gather information and filter it through the inves-
tor’s lenses and also through the lenses of the domestic partner.88 By doing
this, both perspectives can be taken into account, enhancing understanding
and preventing errors that may significantly affect the business relation-
ship.89 Furthermore, failure to understand how much culture influences be-
havior and decision-making may also lead to ineffective interactions
between the investor and government officials, since the government shares
the culture of the market.
3. Efficiency-Seeking Investment: Reconciling Global Standards
and Domestic Culture
In efficiency-seeking investment, investors are motivated to leave the
familiarity of their own countries in search of places where they can operate
with lower costs and higher quality.90 This type of investment is driven by
the “global value chain,”91 in which products are produced and assembled
wherever is most efficient.92 Host countries compete for this type of invest-
ment because it generates jobs and provides access to technology and
know-how.93 Since products are exported, this type of investment does not
compete with the domestic market but helps the host country’s economy.94
For this reason, it is the most sought-after type of investment.95
85. Dolce & Gabbana Fiasco Shows Importance, Risks of China Market, NBC NEWS (Nov.
27, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/dolce-gabbana-fiasco-shows-impor
tance-risks-china-market-n940706.
86. Can Dolce & Gabbana Recover From Its Mistakes in China?, WHARTON SCH. UNIV. PA.
(Dec. 11, 2018), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/dolce-gabbana-mistakes-in-china.
87. Gonstead, supra note 18, at 681–83.
88. See id. at 723–28, 749–50.
89. Id.
90. Cecile Fruman, Why Does Efficiency-Seeking FDI Matter?, WORLD BANK GROUP (Feb.
5, 2016), https://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/why-does-efficiency-seeking-fdi-matter#:~:text=effi-
ciency%2Dseeking%20FDI%20is%20not,with%20greater%20productivity%20and%20value
(referencing the framework created by John Dunning); DUNNING & LUNDAN, supra note 65, at 72.
91. Enrique Martı́nez-Galán & Maria Paula Fontoura, Global Value Chains and Inward FDI
in the 2000s, 24 WORLD ECON. 175, 175 (2018).
92. Global Value Chains (GVCs), OECD, https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/global-value-
chains.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
93. See Policy and Promotion, supra note 66, at 10.
94. See id.
95. See id.
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The impact of cultural challenges can be significant in this type of
investment because of the high level of competition among host countries
and even among states within a host country.96 Unlike in natural resource-
seeking investment, where investors are limited by the places where the
resources are located, or in market-seeking investment, where again the in-
vestor is looking for a specific location, in efficiency-seeking investment
investors are looking for the locations that offer the best conditions for the
production of their goods or services. In this regard, the capacity to under-
stand culture could be a competitive advantage or a significant challenge for
both investors and host governments. It could also be the point of differenti-
ation between two countries that are otherwise similarly situated.
For both investors and host countries, it is essential to have a strategy
for addressing cultural differences that could make or break the deal. In the
case of the investor, the selection of the country is a clear indicator that the
investor believes that is where it can gain a competitive edge. For this rea-
son, the investor has a strong incentive to understand and possibly adapt to
local cultural behavior that is not consistent with the investor’s previous
practices.97
However, the investor must meet global standards in its operations,
and culture can impede this goal because of deeply rooted traditions that
may affect the behaviors and expectations of the labor force. For example,
strictly observed extended holidays may affect production. Ideally, inves-
tors should make a cultural assessment before establishing operations, so
that they can discern whether adaptation is possible and beneficial, or
whether the cultural barriers are impossible to overcome.98
After establishing operations, investors should have ongoing processes
in place to integrate the culture of the labor force. By acknowledging and
respecting cultural practices, the investor may gain not only a more engaged
labor force but also a better understanding of the host country’s culture.99
This better understanding can guide future interactions with representatives
of the government. By enhancing cultural knowledge, investors can better
predict behavior, which in turn can help investors reduce risk.100
Similarly, host countries should consider a strategy for engaging cul-
tural differences with the foreign investors they are trying to attract. For
example, a host country could identify potential sources of culture-based
incompatibilities and discern whether it is possible to adapt in order to de-
96. See id.
97. See Gonstead, supra note 18, at 738–40.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See JAMES HESKETT, THE CULTURE CYCLE 18 (2012) (arguing that cultural understanding
may decrease risk through clearer expectations, increased trust, better communication, and de-
creased uncertainty).
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velop a strong business relationship.101 Cultural norms and their impact on
behavior should not be underestimated. If the organizational culture of the
investor does not align with the culture of the domestic labor force, workers
may disengage and do the bare minimum.102 Therefore, governments
should pay attention to their own national culture as well as the culture of
the foreign investors they are trying to attract. Otherwise, these types of
cultural incompatibilities could lead to divestment.
4. Strategic Asset-Seeking Investment: The Challenges of
Integrating Corporate Cultures
In strategic asset-seeking investment, investors seek a competitive ad-
vantage by acquiring intangible assets through mergers and acquisitions.
These intangible assets include brands, networks for distribution, and labor
forces.103 Acquiring strategic assets facilitates competition by lowering
transaction costs, increasing market share, decreasing risk, and allowing for
more strategic flexibility.104 Usually, this type of investment involves a rig-
orous screening process and a heavily regulatory regime105 because it may
pose a threat to the host country’s economic security.106
The impact of culture in strategic asset-seeking investment is palpable
not only in the relations between the host government and investor but also
within the acquired or merged firm. The relevance of culture within an or-
ganization is fundamental. Within the firm,
[c]ulture consists of what people . . . think they should do, how
they believe they should perform, and what they think will be
rewarded. . . . The importance of an organizational culture cannot
be underestimated. Many organizations have failed to perform ef-
fectively over time because of dysfunctional cultures.107
In any merger or acquisition, the culture of the firm poses a significant
challenge,108 and when investors engage in cross-border transactions, the
culture of the host can add a layer of difficulty.109 The same firm operating
101. See Gonstead, supra note 18, at 729–33, 750–51.
102. See, e.g., Groysberg et al., supra note 60, at 46.
103. DUNNING & LUNDAN, supra note 65, at 72–74.
104. Echandi, supra note 66, at 47.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 51.
107. EDWARD E. LAWLER III, TREAT PEOPLE RIGHT! HOW ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
CAN PROPEL EACH OTHER INTO A VIRTUOUS SPIRAL OF SUCCESS 55 (2008).
108. Michele Gelfand, Sarah Gordon, Chengguang Li, Virginia Choi & Piotr Prokopowicz,
One Reason Mergers Fail: The Two Cultures Aren’t Compatible, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/10/one-reason-mergers-fail-the-two-cultures-arent-compatible (arguing that
disregarding cultural compatibility when companies merge can have a significant negative
impact).
109. Matthew Bird, Merging Two Global Company Cultures, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2,
2020), https://hbr.org/2015/08/merging-two-global-company-cultures.
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in different countries may keep its distinctive corporate culture110 but might
have to adapt to some of the values of the host country. If these cultural
challenges are not taken into account as part of the decision-making process
to acquire strategic assets, and as an integral part of the implementation of
policy, they can severely affect the integration process required to maxi-
mize effectiveness and efficiency.111
In sum, each type of investment poses distinct challenges to the inves-
tor-State business relationship. As discussed, in particular, the role that cul-
ture plays cannot be underestimated given its significance in stakeholder
interactions.
B. A Framework: Conflict Management Mechanisms (CMMs)
To address these challenges at the national level, stakeholders should
first consider conflict management mechanisms (CMMs).112 CMMs are the
current framework that host countries use not only to prevent conflict from
escalating into legal disputes at the international level but also to effectively
solve issues that may arise between foreign investors and host countries in
order to promote and retain investment.113
In the past, there was no infrastructure for investors and States to inter-
act effectively before conflict escalated and became a legal dispute.114 In
other words, it is as if there were no swimming pools in which they could
swim. As I emphasized in one of my prior works,
[T]he central issue in developing a sustainable relationship be-
tween investors and host States is the marked gap between the IIA
rights and offered IIA remedies—namely the arbitration process.
Focusing on after-the-fact monetary solutions as a catch-all, with-
out considering more constructive processes, inhibits the growth
of the relationship.115
To illustrate the dynamic of the investor-State business relationship, I have
used the analogy of a landlord and tenant relationship:
Just as a renter is subject to the rules of the house and vulnerable
to the decisions of the landlord, so too the foreign investor has to
operate within the framework of the host country’s political, so-
cial, and economic landscape. Under the current structure of IIAs,
110. HALLAM MOVIUS & LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, BUILT TO WIN 144 (2009) (arguing that val-
ues—when aligned with incentives—are essential to affect the behavior of the workforce, and
suggesting that mere discussion about values and explicit written statements are insufficient to this
end).
111. TAYLOR COX JR., CREATING THE MULTICULTURAL ORGANIZATION 103 (2001) (discussing
how change has to be done at a systemic level with an understanding of the firm as an interdepen-
dent social system).
112. Echandi, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Crespo, supra note 10, at 55–58.
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if the renter (foreign investor) was not satisfied with the land-
lord’s (host country’s) implementation of some aspects of the
agreement, no matter what kind of dispute, the main recourse
available is to sue the landlord (arbitration), likely resulting in the
severance of the relationship.116
I have suggested that when these tensions arise,
[r]ather than resolving tensions with extreme options, IIA dis-
putes might consider other options. Foreign investors have a sig-
nificant relationship with the host country, made up of joint
human resources, environmental concerns, and an interlocking of
the foreign entity into the larger economic network of the country.
That relationship is generally worth preserving. By the time con-
flict arises there is a substantial interconnection between the two
entities, even if through a myriad of representatives.117
Thus, to improve the investment climate of a host country, investor-State
dispute settlement at the international level is insufficient. Investor-State
dispute settlement allows for the resolution of legal disputes, but CMMs
focus on the enhancement of the ongoing relationship between the key
stakeholders on the ground, namely foreign investors, government officials
from the host country, and local communities.118 CMMs increase the capac-
ity of the government to manage conflict domestically before it escalates
into a legal dispute addressed through an international arbitration
process.119
Because governments are composed of agencies and other federal,
state, and local authorities, their organizational structure poses a challenge
to coordinating governmental response to foreign investors. In some cases,
conflict can occur because of the lack of coordination and information shar-
ing among these various authorities.120 To address this challenge, host
countries have started to utilize CMMs such as the “Systemic Investment
Response Mechanisms” (SIRM), conceptualized by Roberto Echandi and
implemented by the World Bank Group.121 SIRMs are the protocol
frameworks that facilitate effective and efficient interactions between gov-
ernment officials and foreign investors. SIRMs were defined in the G-20
Compact with Africa as an
early warning and tracking mechanism to identify and resolve
complaints and issues that arise from government conduct . . . ,
ultimately preventing legal disputes and facilitating harmonious
relations between investors and governments. . . . [SIRM] enables
countries to collect data and helps identify patterns in govern-
116. Id. at 58.
117. Id.
118. See Echandi & Gonstead, supra note 17, at 337–38.
119. Id.
120. See id. (describing the need for CMMs before conflict escalates to legal disputes).
121. Echandi, supra note 17, at 270–305.
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ment-generated grievances affecting investments. . . . SIRM
quantifies investment retained or expanded as a consequence of
addressing grievances, as well as investment lost as a conse-
quence of not addressing them.122
The six basic protocols for the establishment and operation of SIRMs
are (1) stocktaking, (2) lead agency, (3) information sharing, (4) early alert
mechanisms, (5) problem-solving techniques—Shared Decisions System
Design (SDSD), and (6) political decision-making and enforcement.123 As
part of the problem-solving mechanisms of SIRMs, and when issues are
systemic, systems can be designed to allow the participation of multiple
stakeholders affected by the same issues through SDSD. SDSD offers an
analytical framework to integrate the interests of investors, States, and com-
munities when the decision affects them directly. This framework for deci-
sion-making includes addressing differences pre-conflict, and also through
rulemaking, policy implementation, and conflict management with a focus
on the relationship between the stakeholders.124
The emphasis is placed on the relationship to avoid divestment instead
of on preventing disputes. For these reasons, CMMs constitute an important
framework for problem-solving. In particular, SDSD integrates facilitative
processes, which provide opportunities to strengthen the investor-State bus-
iness relationship by aiming to satisfy the interests of all.125
C. Intercultural Capacity Building: Optimizing Problem-Solving within
the Investor-State Business Relationship
The previous section introduced the infrastructure for problem-solving
as a foundation to facilitate effective and efficient interactions between rep-
resentatives of the host country and foreign investor, and in some cases the
communities. However, to maximize its potential, stakeholders must de-
velop intercultural skills.126 As has been emphasized,
Perhaps the biggest threat to the positive relationship required for
any successful negotiation comes with cross-cultural bargain-
ing—when the potential for misunderstanding and confusion rises
sharply. As businesses from around the world increasingly inter-
122. WBG, Afr. Dev. Bank & IMF, The G-20 Compact with Africa, Report to the G-20 Fi-
nance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting, at 23 (2017), https://
www.compactwithafrica.org/content/dam/Compact%20with%20Africa/2017-03-30-g20-compact-
with-africa-report.pdf.
123. See Echandi & Gonstead, supra note 17, at 337–38.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Don Peters, Can We Talk? Overcoming Barriers to Mediating Private Trans-
border Commercial Disputes in the Americas, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1251, 1275–80,
1288–90 (2008) (arguing that intercultural skills are essential in cross-border interactions).
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act with one another, the ability to engage skillful collaborative
negotiation is more important than ever.127
This section discusses the need to develop intercultural capacities to
enhance mutual understanding of the values that drive the decision-making
process128 and ensure both predictability and higher levels of satisfaction.
As stated previously, the infrastructure for problem-solving (CMMs) is
analogous to a swimming pool, and these capacities are analogous to the
ability to swim. To maximize the benefits of intercultural problem-solving,
stakeholders must have both.
1. At the Bargaining Table: Tools to Enhance Understanding,
Predictability, and Engagement in Negotiation, Mediation,
and Consensus Building
Culture may not be as significant in adjudicative processes such as
arbitration because of its emphasis on securing investment through legal
rights. However, in interest-based, facilitative processes such as negotia-
tion, mediation, and consensus building, culture can be a catalyst for
strengthening the relationship, which may lead to higher levels of innova-
tion and growth.129 Failure to properly engage culture can also place signifi-
cant barriers at the bargaining table.130
By identifying the driving values of parties,131 we are better able to
predict behavior, enhance understanding, and mutually discern the optimal
level of integration. To accomplish this, I have developed “The Cultural
Value Toolbox,” which contains three essential value-based tools: (1) Value
Discernment, (2) Value Glasses, and (3) Value Spectrum.132 By using these
tools, parties are able to integrate their cultural differences, which may lead
to maximization of joint gains and higher levels of satisfaction. Used in
conjunction, these value-based tools utilize culture as a transversal factor in
interest-based, facilitative processes.
i. Value Discernment Tool: Enhancing Predictability
The level of commitment among the parties is one of the distinct char-
acteristics of the business relationship in FDI. Generally, investors have
127. WINNING NEGOTIATIONS THAT PRESERVE RELATIONSHIPS 143 (HARV. BUS. SCH. PRESS
2004).
128. TROMPENAARS & HAMPDEN-TURNER, supra note 61, at 193 (explaining cultural problems
are often unidentified or perceived as stubbornness).
129. See Gonstead, supra note 18, at 704–16.
130. See, e.g., MICHELLE LEBARON & VENASHRI PILLAY, CONFLICT ACROSS CULTURES 92
(2006) (“Cultural differences make conflict harder to resolve because they expand the potential for
misunderstandings and misperceptions.”).
131. See generally Kevin Avruch, Toward an Expanded “Cannon” of Negotiation Theory:
Identity, Ideological, and Values-Based Conflict and the Need for a New Heuristic, 89 MARQ. L.
REV. 567 (2006).
132. Gonstead, supra note 18, at 713.
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spent significant resources to establish operations in the host country. Simi-
larly, the host country will have expended resources to attract foreign inves-
tors. Both expect to benefit from a long-term relationship.133 This high level
of commitment is matched by the level of complexity in cross-border rela-
tionships. As I have emphasized,
[S]ome of the most complex interactions across cultures take
place in the context of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The for-
eign investors’ corporate culture, to some degree, is immersed in
the culture of the host country. The foreign investors have to not
only interact with clients and personnel, but also with the govern-
ment and the local community.134
It is in this context that the Value Discernment Tool could play a critical
role not only as an integral part of the negotiation, mediation, and consen-
sus-building process, but also in process design.135 Identifying the distinct
cultural values of host countries, investors, and communities makes it is
possible to adapt processes136 and roles to reflect the stakeholders’ goals137
and values.
In the field of negotiation, moving from position-based bargaining
(what the parties want) to interest-based bargaining (why they want it) rep-
resented a quantum leap. By exploring the underlying reasons for the de-
mands at the bargaining table, the proposal of the best-selling book Getting
to Yes allows the parties to create options that do not require compro-
mise.138 Compromise requires at least one of the parties to not be fully
satisfied.139
The alternative to compromise, as promoted in Getting to Yes, is the
possibility of creating value together. Once parties identify the interests un-
derlying their positions, they can generate options that aim to satisfy both of
their interests.140 In this way, they are able to maximize “joint gains”141 and
create sustainable agreements that are “nearly self-enforcing.”142 This is be-
cause the parties are better off with the agreement than without it. There-
fore, it is generally in their best interest to comply with it.143
133. See Salacuse, supra note 24, at 138–43, 146–47, 154–56.
134. Gonstead, supra note 18, at 746.
135. Golbert, supra note 37, at 97 (concluding that to be “truly responsive to context and to
culture [an approach] must do more than explain and translate important cultural differences”).
136. The flexibility of the IBA rules provide an extraordinary opportunity for mediation pro-
cess design. Joubin-Bret & Legum, supra note 33, at 17–24. For further discussion on the media-
tion rules, see Legum et al., supra note 33, at 265. See also Franck, supra note 33, at 66–89.
137. Welsh & Schneider, supra note 36, at 95–96.
138. See generally FISHER ET AL., supra note 52.
139. Id. at 3–15 (arguing that positional bargaining leads to less than satisfactory agreements).
140. Id. at 42–81.
141. Id. at 72.
142. LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND & JEFFREY L. CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES: THE
NEW WAY TO RUN YOUR MEETING, BUILD CONSENSUS, AND GET RESULTS 133–54 (1st ed. 2006).
143. Id.
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Interest-based processes are foundational to the field of appropriate
dispute resolution. However, to maximize the processes’ potential, the par-
ties must connect their interests with their corresponding values to discover
one of the driving forces in their decision-making process.144
Until now, values have most commonly been considered when they
clashed.145 The goal has been to address values in a separate process that
focuses on understanding. Even though acknowledging the parties’ values
is a step in the right direction, consideration of values cannot be limited to
times when they clash. Instead, values should be considered in every nego-
tiation process. Making the identification of values an integral part of inter-
est-based processes is indispensable to enhancing understanding at the
bargaining table, especially when the parties do not share a culture.146
Stopping at the interest level assumes that every negotiation is simply
a transaction, rather than a critical interaction that shapes and is shaped by
the ongoing relationship between the parties. As parties from different cul-
tures increasingly interact with each other,
staying at the interest level[ ] can at best lead to subpar agree-
ments[ ] and at worst alienate a significant number of cultures
around the world, for whom the relational aspect of the negotia-
tion is an integral component.147
For these reasons, I have argued that interest-based processes are insuffi-
cient when the situation demands “some understanding of the parties’ dis-
tinct personal and cultural/collective values, and how those values affect
their relationship.”148 To this end, I developed the Value Discernment Tool
as a straightforward process149 in which we are adding one question to the
interest-based process: “why is that (interest) important to you?” As I have
previously stated,
144. See Gonstead, supra note 18, at 709–10, 718–23.
145. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & PATRICK FIELD, DEALING WITH AN ANGRY PUBLIC: THE MUTUAL
GAINS APPROACH TO RESOLVING DISPUTES 152–97 (1996); see, e.g., Four Conflict Negotiation
Strategies for Resolving Value-Based Disputes, HARV. L. SCH.: PROGRAM ON NEGOT. (Mar. 21,
2019), https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/dispute-resolution/four-negotiation-strategies-for-
resolving-values-based-disputes; Values-Based Mediation Simulations, HARV. L. SCH.: PROGRAM
ON NEGOT., https://www.pon.harvard.edu/shop/values-based-mediation-simulations (last visited
Apr. 12, 2020); see also JOHN FORESTER, DEALING WITH DIFFERENCES 59–91 (2009) (explaining
value-based disputes and how to handle them in participatory processes); Lawrence Susskind,
How to Negotiate When Values Are at Stake, CONSENSUS BUILDING INST. (Oct. 2010), https://
www.cbi.org/article/2010/how-to-negotiate-when-values-are-at-stake (suggesting that if there is a
conflict of values, it should be addressed in a separate process from the interest-based conflict).
See generally Gonstead, supra note 18.
146. Gonstead, supra note 18, at 718–23.
147. Id. at 720.
148. Id.
149. Peter F. Drucker, The Discipline of Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 2002), https://
hbr.org/2002/08/the-discipline-of-innovation (“To be effective, an innovation has to be simple,
and it has to be focused. It should do only one thing; otherwise it confuses people. . . . Effective
innovations start small.”).
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Learning why parties care about a particular interest opens the
door to understanding what truly matters to them. Values are the
driving force behind the parties’ articulated positions and interests
that guide the decisionmaking [sic] process. These values are the
core of who we are and the cultures to which we belong. There-
fore, this additional inquiry is often worth the effort, as it can
enhance understanding of the parties’ motivations.150
Identifying individual values151 allows us to gain deeper knowledge of the
parties, which in turn translates into better strategies for efficient and effec-
tive interactions. This value identification is particularly relevant in the field
of FDI, where an ongoing relationship is of the essence.152
Using the value-based tool in interest-based negotiations could be per-
ceived as an unnecessary step because parties can move beyond compro-
mise without knowing the values of their business partners. While this is
true, an interest-based resolution primarily addresses the issue at hand,
missing an extraordinary opportunity to gain the knowledge of the parties’
motivations necessary to predict future behavior and reach an optimal
agreement.153
Some may argue that revealing values could increase the parties’ vul-
nerability.154 Yet, without revealing and learning who the parties are at the
value level, it may not be possible to fully understand the identity of those
with whom we are trying to build a business relationship. As it has been
stated, “[V]ulnerability does not come after trust—it precedes it”155 and
“[a]t some level, we intuitively know that vulnerability tends to spark coop-
eration and trust.”156 Furthermore, by strengthening the relationship through
value discernment, each party sees itself as an integral part of the whole—
trusting the other to act in its best interest—thereby decreasing competition
while increasing collaboration.157 If we connect at the value level, we will
be better equipped to build the bond required for effective interactions.
150. Gonstead, supra note 18, at 718.
151. There are many ways to categorize values. See, e.g., Patrick M. Lencionci, Make Your
Values Mean Something, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jul. 2002), https://hbr.org/2002/07/make-your-values-
mean-something (categorizing values as (1) Core values as deeply-held values that guide actions;
(2) Permission-to-Play values, which reflect the minimum standard of behavior; (3) Aspirational
values, which reflect ideals not yet realized; and (4) Accidental values, which are spontaneous and
reflect current group interests).
152. See Gonstead, supra note 18, at 719 (“[T]he Cultural Value Discernment (CVD) provides
relevant information, by revealing the value motivating the other’s decisionmaking [sic]
process.”).
153. See generally Gonstead, supra note 18, at 720.
154. Jayne Seminare Docherty, Symposium: Culture and Negotiation: Symmetrical Anthropol-
ogy for Negotiators, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 711, 719 (2004).
155. DANIEL COYLE, CULTURE CODE 107 (2018).
156. Id. at 103.
157. See generally Gonstead, supra note 10, at 56. See also Keld Jenson, Why Negotiators
Still Aren’t Getting to Yes, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/keldjensen/2013/
02/05/why-negotiators-still-arent-getting-to-yes/#7bc377392640 (“Low trust makes collaboration
impossible!”).
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ii. Value Glasses Tool: Increasing Understanding
In FDI, when parties are at the bargaining table, because of the distinct
cultures of their home countries, and the private-public nature of the rela-
tionship, significant tensions can arise with regard to process and substance.
This happens because culture affects the way a person filters and interprets
data.158 Also, if cultural differences are not accounted for regarding expec-
tations about process and the role of a neutral mediator or facilitator, the
parties may miss opportunities to enhance understanding, increase satisfac-
tion, and create a more sustainable agreement.
I have previously argued that culture needs to be treated as a transver-
sal factor in every stage of the interest-based process:
Culture has generally been treated as one factor to consider dur-
ing the problem-solving process, rather than an intrinsic and fun-
damental component. However, it is necessary to develop a
framework that treats culture as a transversal aspect that affects
every single stage of the process, rather than treating it as an iso-
lated element. Culture not only has implications at the external
level (non-verbal signals, words, behaviors), but it also deeply
impacts our cognitive processes (perceptions, expectations,
interpretations).159
These implications affect the way we communicate and interact, signifi-
cantly increasing the level of difficulty for understanding one another, be-
cause of how culture affects what we perceive, expect, and interpret160 at
the bargaining table.161 To address the challenges that culture poses in inter-
est-based, facilitative processes, I developed the Value Glasses Tool, which
“provide[s] guidelines for assessing how personal and cultural values af-
fect . . . information gathering, generation of options, selection of options,
and . . . drafting of agreements.”162
We all have a unique set of glasses that are formed of a variety of
lenses. Each lens reflects the values that we have adopted from the cultural
groups of which we are a part.163 Our unique glasses are ever-present, de-
158. Gonstead, supra note 18, at 713.
159. Id. at 724.
160. Bee Chen Goh, Habib Chamoun-Nicolas, Ellen E. Deason, Jay Folberg & Sukhsimranjit
Singh, As We See It, in EDUCATING NEGOTIATORS FOR A CONNECTED WORLD 103, 103–24 (2012)
(arguing that familiarity affects our assumptions and expectations).
161. See generally Mariana Hernandez-Crespo, Workshop 1: Global Opportunities and Con-
flicts: The Need for Cross-Cultural Mediation, in MEDIATION: A ONE TRICK PONY? USING MEDIA-
TION IN THE WIDER CONTEXT 48, 48–59 (Chartered Institute of Arbitrators ed., 2013).
162. Gonstead, supra note 18, at 726.
163. See, e.g., Michael W. Morris & Michelle J. Gelfand, Expanding the Cognitive Perspec-
tive of Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 45, 45–70 (Michelle J.
Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004) (“We gain a deeper understanding of familiar biases when
we trace them back not only to knowledge structures, but to the socialization practices and institu-
tions that the knowledge structures reflect.”).
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velop over time, and are constantly changing.164 If we fail to acknowledge
our own glasses as well as the other sides’ and the experts’ glasses,165 we
may miss or misinterpret information that may be fundamental to resolving
the issue at hand, to strengthening the relationship, or to both.
Interest-based processes, in particular mediation, should be ideal fo-
rums166 for parties to better understand their cultural differences.167 How-
ever, the presence of experts at the table, such as mediators,168 adds a level
of complexity with the addition of a new culture.169 Unlike in adjudicative
processes where the third-party neutral is the decision maker, in interest-
based processes the third-party expert (mediator or facilitator in consensus
building) mainly guides the process and assists the parties in reaching a
sustainable agreement. To this end, understanding the culture of the parties
and third-party experts can play a significant role.170
Culture has been described as the “silent language.”171 The mediator
can act as a translator of this silent language to facilitate understanding.
Furthermore, having two mediators rather than one can help bridge the cul-
tural gap between the parties.172 Co-mediation173 is particularly helpful
164. Michelle LeBaron, Transforming Cultural Conflict in an Age of Complexity, in Berghof
Handbook for Conflict Transformation 1, 2–8 (2001).
165. See, e.g., Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 WASH.
U.J.L. & POL’Y 71 (2010) (discussing implicit bias in mediation).
166. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Tradi-
tions, Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices, in FOUNDATIONS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (VOL. 1)
258–59 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow ed., 2012) (discussing the potential of the mediation process).
“[In mediation] we may learn about new kinds of communication, human interaction, and problem
solving that may challenge, transform, and supplement—as well as supplant—other ways of con-
flict resolution and political change.” Id. at 359.
167. Steven Weller, John A. Martin & John Paul Lederach, Fostering Culturally Responsive
Courts: The Case of Family Dispute Resolution for Latinos, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 185, 186 (2001)
(“One method of dispute resolution that should be able to provide a culturally sensitive forum is
mediation.”).
168. John Barkai, What’s a Cross-Cultural Mediator to Do? A Low-Context Solution for a
High-Context Problem, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 43, 81–86 (2008) (discussing that the
culture of the mediators has a significant impact on them) (“Just as Popeye’s words imply that
Popeye cannot change who he is, mediators with low-context communication styles may not be
able to adjust their communication styles to work well with high-context communicating
parties.”).
169. See generally Fred D. Butler, The Question of Race, Gender & Culture in Mediator
Selection, 55 DISP. RESOL. J. 36 (2001) (noting that cultural competency cannot be assumed from
shared race or gender, and suggesting co-mediation).
170. Joe Epstein & Robyn McDonald, The Influence of Cultural Diversity in Mediating Com-
plex Multi-Party and Catastrophic Loss Conflict, MEDIATE.COM (Aug. 2011), https://
www.mediate.com/articles/EpsteinJ1.cfm (“In complex multi-party cases, co-mediation with
mediators who blend their own mix of cultural experiences and styles might be what the situation
requires to create the opportunities for resolution.”).
171. JESWALD SALACUSE, THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATOR 90 (2003); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Ten
Ways That Culture Affects Negotiating Style: Some Survey Results, 14 NEGOT. J. 221, 222 (1998).
172. Harold Abramson, Crossing Borders into New Ethical Territory: Ethical Challenges
When Mediating Cross-Culturally, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 921, 925 (2008).
173. The IBA Rules for Investor-State Mediation specifically refer to the designation of co-
mediators, in Article 4, regarding the designation of a mediator, and in Article 6, regarding desig-
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when the parties do not share cultural knowledge. A marked gap in cultural
knowledge can hinder the parties’ interactions and severely affect under-
standing. To alleviate these issues, co-mediators who share cultural ties
with the parties can help recognize and address the challenge that culture
presents at each stage of mediation,174 as well as reconcile the parties’ val-
ues with the process.175
iii. Value Spectrum Tool: Discerning Level of Integration
Stakeholders may benefit from determining the level of integration that
is most advantageous for an effective and efficient partnership.176 This is
particularly relevant in FDI because of the multiple cultures involved and
their respective values. These cultures include not only those of the local
community and host country but also the corporate culture of the inves-
tor.177 I have previously argued that
[i]n order to facilitate . . . discernment [of the appropriate level of
integration], the Cultural Value Integration Spectrum (CVIS) is
conducted through three steps. First, the identification of stake-
holders’ values through the Cultural Value Discernment (CVD);
second, an assessment of the stakeholders’ value compatibility
and the level of integration of their cultural values on a spectrum
that goes from co-existence [sharing resources], to collaboration
[sharing a goal], to complementarity [sharing core values]; third,
based on the information gained in the first two steps, appropriate
processes and systems can be designed for dispute resolution.178
nation, resignation, and replacement of co-mediators. Joubin-Bret & Legum, supra note 33, at 1,
17–24.
174. Bianca Keys, Co-mediation: Positives, Pitfalls and Lessons Learned, 11 ADR BULLETIN
1, 1–5 (2009) (stating that mediators have a unique opportunity to model teamwork and show how
unity can be reached).
175. Joe Epstein & Susan Epstein, Co-Mediation, 35 THE COLO. LAWYER 21, 23 (June 2006)
(“In some instances, such as international business transaction disputes, a cross-cultural co-media-
tion team might be the best method to evoke the trust and understanding needed to enable a
peaceful resolution of the conflict.”).
176. Douglas M. Lambert & A. Michael Knemeyer, We’re in This Together, HARV. BUS. REV.
5–6 (Dec. 2004), https://hbr.org/2004/12/were-in-this-together (explaining the Partnership Model
for facilitators to evaluate company compatibility to determine the appropriate compatibility level,
from arms-length relationship to limited coordination partnership to integration partnership to
partnership where the companies view each other as an extension of their operations); Rosabeth
Moss Kanter, Collaborative Advantage, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jul.–Aug. 1994), https://hbr.org/1994/
07/collaborative-advantage-the-art-of-alliances (explaining the Collaborative Advantage spec-
trum, which assesses how strong and deep a relationship is on a spectrum ranging from mutual
service to joint-venture to value-chain partnership). Both models highlight the significance of
culture and values when determining the level of integration in a business relationship.
177. I have previously argued that processes such as World Café dialogues enhance under-
standing among participants. For a discussion of the potential of these processes, see, for example,
Jacqueline N. Font-Guzmán, Moving ‘Beyond Neutrality’ and Cross-cultural Training: Using
World Café Dialogue to Address End-of-life Care Inequalities, 21 PEACE & CONFLICT STUD. 49,
49 (2014).
178. Gonstead, supra note 18, at 750.
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This value spectrum tool could assist in determining the appropriate level of
cultural integration,179 which could enhance the selection or design of the
process at the bargaining table.180 As I have written,
[T]he different approaches of mediation, such as facilitative, eval-
uative, transformative, and narrative, can be utilized to assist for-
eign investors, host States, and communities in the designing of
processes for decisionmaking [sic] and dispute resolution that
take in to account the appropriate level of cultural integration de-
termined by the Cultural Value Integration Spectrum (CVIS). Re-
flecting stakeholders’ values in the processes can make
interactions between foreign investors and host States more effi-
cient and effective.181
The CVIS is a tool to help parties make informed decisions at the bargain-
ing table and as part of their ongoing relationship. Failure to recognize a
clash in values not only could result in lost opportunities for a stronger
relationship but also could weaken or break the business partnership.
2. When Conflict Erupts: Tools for Efficient and Effective Process
Selection
I have written extensively about the need to overcome conflict illiter-
acy.182 In this section, I discuss the need to understand the sources of con-
flict and the variables (including culture). Without understanding the
sources of conflict, we will be less effective selecting or designing the ap-
propriate process and identifying experts for when conflict erupts.
i. Conflict Assessment: Diagnosing to Maximize Effectiveness
The time has come to shift the focus from preventing conflict escala-
tion to understanding its source. Currently, when conflict escalates, parties
tend to end up in arbitration or litigation.183 However, depending on the
179. Raymond Cohen, An Advocates’ View, in CULTURE AND NEGOTIATION 22, 37 (Guy Oli-
vier Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1993) (“Disharmonies in negotiation, then, derive from
profound philosophical and methodological incompatibilities, not just from superficial, stylistic
differences or monetary misunderstanding.”).
180. Brian Gunia, Jeanne Brett & Amit Nandkeolyar, In Global Negotiations, It’s All About
Trust, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/12/in-global-negotiations-its-all-about-
trust (discussing three levels of trust: “1) when trust is likely, 2) when trust seems possible, 3)
when trust is not possible”).
181. Gonstead, supra note 18, at 750.
182. See generally Gonstead, supra note 16.
183. See, e.g., JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A NUT-
SHELL 1 (4th ed. 2013) (“The chief purpose of this book is to disabuse you of the ‘one size fits all’
litigation mentality and to help you understand and appreciate that more creative problem-solving
is available through alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes.”).
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type of conflict, its context, and the culture(s) in which it is occurring, other
processes could be better suited to satisfying the interests of the parties.184
As I have explained in my previous work, conflict can be compared to
illness.185 When we go to doctors, they do not prescribe brain surgery for a
mere headache. Instead, doctors assess symptoms to determine an accurate
diagnosis before determining the appropriate treatment.186 Similarly, con-
flict should not be sent straight to litigation.187 In the legal field, we need to
become doctors of conflict and analyze the conflict at hand before selecting
or designing the appropriate process.188 To this end, I have suggested a
“Comprehensive Framework for Conflict Resolution” that places culture at
the center of conflict assessment as well as at the center of selecting the
resolution process. As I have previously stated,
If you are ill, merely determining you have an illness is insuffi-
cient. Instead, it is necessary to have a comprehensive framework
that would help make an accurate diagnosis. As part of this
framework, the first factor on the checklist is the type of illness
you have and its source. The second factor is who you are, your
goals, specific needs, and priorities. The third factor is awareness
of your mindset because your culture, namely the social norms of
the group in which you operate, and your perception of the prob-
lem may also affect the treatment selection.189
Once we understand (1) the source of conflict;190 (2) the parties at the table,
third parties affected, and the broader system in which they interact;191 and
(3) their mindsets192 and how those mindsets have affected their relations,
184. See MARY PARKER FOLLETT, PROPHET OF MANAGEMENT: A CELEBRATION OF WRITINGS
FROM THE 1920S 22 (Pauline Graham ed., 1995) (arguing that we need to expand how we deal
with conflict).
185. Gonstead, supra note 16, at 2194–95.
186. STEPHEN R. COVEY, THE 7 HABITS OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PEOPLE: POWERFUL LESSONS IN
PERSONAL CHANGE 243 (2013) (“Although it’s risky and hard, seek first to understand, or diag-
nose before you prescribe, is a correct principle manifest in many areas of life. It’s the mark of all
true professionals. It’s critical for the optometrist, it’s critical for the physician. You wouldn’t
have any confidence in a doctor’s prescription unless you had confidence in the diagnosis.”).
187. See John R. Allison, Five Ways to Keep Disputes out of Court, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Jan.–Feb. 1990), https://hbr.org/1990/01/five-ways-to-keep-disputes-out-of-court (explaining the
cost and damage that litigation poses for business organizations).
188. See Gonstead, supra note 16, at 2195 (explaining that the source of a conflict must be
determined to properly assess and select a process); LAURIE S. COLTRI, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: A CONFLICT DIAGNOSIS APPROACH 103–24 (2d ed. 2020) (distinguishing the sources
of conflict).
189. Gonstead, supra note 16, at 2194–95.
190. See, e.g., COLTRI, supra note 188, at 103–24 (identifying the sources of conflict).
191. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t Everything: The Lawyer as
Problem Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 909–10 (2000).
192. MARK GERZON, LEADING THROUGH CONFLICT: HOW SUCCESSFUL LEADERS TRANSFORM
DIFFERENCES INTO OPPORTUNITIES 17–47 (2006) (discussing how we assume three distinct mind-
sets in our interactions with others).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-2\UST204.txt unknown Seq: 35  8-JUN-21 9:46
2021] BEYOND INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES 285
then we are ready to select or design a process to address the parties’ spe-
cific needs.
ii. Process Selection or Design: Tailoring to Optimize
Resolution
When selecting or designing the appropriate process for resolution of a
specific issue, I have suggested a framework which builds upon the knowl-
edge of the dispute resolution field and incorporates culture. This “Compre-
hensive Framework for Conflict Resolution . . . [includes] a selection
checklist with three factors: (1) the levels of party self-determination and
control over process and outcome, (2) the satisfaction of parties’ objectives,
and (3) the cultural implications of uniformity or unity.”193
TABLE 4: THE LEVELS OF PARTY SELF-DETERMINATION AND CONTROL






(+ “Staying with 
Conflict,” etc.) 
Selection of the Process 











Level of Party 
Self-
Determination 
Minimal Moderate Maximum 
Implications for Cultural Realm 
Mindset Domination Competition Collaboration 
Logic Coercion Persuasion Participation 
Cultural Process Assimilation Assimilation 
Levels of 
Integration 
Outcome Uniformity Uniformity 
Some Level of 
Unity 
193. Gonstead, supra note 16, at 2199.
194. Id.
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iii. Level of Self-Determination and Control for Process and
Outcome
With regard to the level of each party’s self-determination195 and con-
trol over the process, it is important to note that processes directly affect
how much decision-making power the parties are keeping or delegating. On
one end of the spectrum,196 in adjudicative processes,197 such as the court
system198 or arbitration,199 the parties delegate decision-making power to a
third party such as the judge or arbiter. In the court system, parties delegate
complete control over process and outcome to the judiciary. In arbitration,
the parties retain control over a number of factors, such as selecting the
decision maker, substantive law, and process.200
On the other end of the spectrum, in facilitative processes such as ne-
gotiation, mediation, consensus building, and others,201 the parties are the
protagonists since they are the decision makers.202 In negotiation, the par-
ties have control over process and outcome, while in mediation and other
195. Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Self-Determination in International Mediation: Some Prelimi-
nary Reflections, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 277, 277 (2005) (“[U]nderstanding of self-
determination is rooted in the philosophical principle of personal autonomy and is expressed
through the legal doctrine of informed consent. The simple version of the normative story states
that those who are affected by a dispute should voluntarily consent to the outcome of that dispute.
In short, ‘party’ self-determination in mediation gives ownership of the conflict to the
disputants.”).
196. See generally Frank E.A. Sander, Professor of Law, Harvard Univ., Address at the Na-
tional Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice:
Varieties of Dispute Processing (Apr. 7–9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 111, 111–18, 120, 124–32 (1976)
(introducing the spectrum at the Pound Conference); LISA BLOMGREN AMSLER, JANET MARTINEZ
& STEPHANIE E. SMITH, DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN: PREVENTING, MANAGING, AND RESOLVING
CONFLICT (2020).
197. LON L. FULLER, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL
ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 101, 105–06, 108–09, 113, 126–28, 133 (Kenneth
Winston ed., 2002) (explaining the distinct characteristics of adjudicative processes).
198. Lela P. Love, Images of Justice, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 29, 29–30 (2000) (explaining
the power of the judiciary).
199. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER, NANCY ROGERS & SARAH RU-
DOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, ARBITRATION & OTHER
PROCESSES 601–21 (5th ed. 2007); see also FRANK E.A. SANDER ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, ARBITRATION & OTHER PROCESSES 303–12 (6th ed. 2012).
200. See FRANK E.A. SANDER ET AL., supra note 199.
201. See, e.g., Font-Guzmán, supra note 177, at 50–51 (arguing for other processes, such as
the World Café dialogues).
202. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction to MEDIATION: THEORY, POLICY AND
PRACTICE, at xiii (Carrie Menkel-Meadow ed., 2001) (explaining the distinct role of the mediation
process, given its consensual, voluntary, participatory, and facilitative nature; arguing its advan-
tage to enhance understanding and reach a mutually satisfying agreement); Jacqueline M. Nolan-
Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 54–55
(1996) (“Mediation is thought to enhance parties’ self-determinative capabilities because it per-
mits them to structure and consent to the outcome of the bargaining process.”). See also Nancy A.
Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 135–36 (2004) (“Citizens—not judges or attorneys or other profession-
als—would communicate and negotiate directly with each other, identify the issues to be dis-
cussed, determine the substantive norms that were legitimate and relevant (including the pursuit of
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expert-led processes,203 they give up some control. That being said, the par-
ties are still in control of the final outcome.
In addition, parties can select or design hybrid processes204 that com-
bine some of the essential elements205 of other processes that are better
suited to their particular needs.206 Paying attention to the level of party self-
determination is the first essential step when making informed decisions
about process selection or design.
iv. The Satisfaction of Parties’ Objectives
The next step when selecting or designing the process is to ensure that
it satisfies the goals or objectives of the parties. Frank Sander and Stephen
Goldberg place these goals in eight categories: “Minimize Costs,” “Speed,”
“Privacy,” “Maintain/Improve Relationship,” “Vindication,” “Neutral
Opinion,” “Precedent,” and “Maximizing/Minimizing Recovery.”207 How-
ever, there may be additional goals or objectives that affect the assessment
of the process’s suitability.208 It is also possible that none of the processes
or hybrids that already exist can satisfy the parties’ objectives. When this is
the case, experts lead the parties in the design of a new process that aims to
satisfy their needs.209
harmony and reconciliation if they wished), create the options for settlement, and control the final
decision regarding whether or not to settle and on what terms.”).
203. See, e.g., CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, LELA PORTER LOVE, ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER
& JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 386 (2d ed.
2011) (explaining that the parties are in charge of the outcome in negotiation, whereas in media-
tion the parties are guided by a mediator).
204. See generally Ellen E. Deason, Combinations of Mediation and Arbitration with the
Same Neutral: A Framework for Judicial Review, 5 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 219, 221–24
(2013) (explaining the arb-med hybrid); Harold I. Abramson, Protocols for International Arbitra-
tors Who Dare to Settle Cases, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 3–5 (1999) (alerting to the problems
associated with utilizing the same expert as a mediator and arbiter).
205. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellec-
tual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 29 (2000).
206. See, e.g., NOLAN-HALEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 181 (explaining some of the problems
of utilizing mediation or arbitration as distinct processes, and suggesting that because of the is-
sues, elements of each are combined).
207. Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49, 50–52, 66 (1994).
208. See, e.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Building a Pedagogy of Problem-Solving: Learning
to Choose Among ADR Processes, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 113, 123–24 (2000) (discussing the
need to consider the impact that the process selection can have on the mental health of the client).
209. NOLAN-HALEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 12–15 (discussing the need for process design as
a way to align values with the mediation process in the context of our global landscape).
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v. The Cultural Implications of Uniformity or Unity
Process selection affects culture210 while also being shaped by it.211
Depending on the system used to resolve conflict—power-based, rights-
based, or interest-based,212 the cultural consequences will vary.213
In power-based systems,214 the winners generally impose their cultural
values on the others.215 The power-based system resolves conflict through
force by using the logic of coercion and a mindset of domination. It ulti-
mately aims to achieve uniformity through assimilation. In the FDI context,
this is how conflicts were resolved before bilateral treaties.216
The rise of bilateral treaties gave birth to a system of rights. In rights-
based systems,217 the winner is allowed to impose the values already re-
flected in the agreed-upon rights. The rights-based system introduced the
mindset of competition and the logic of persuasion. Similar to a power-
based system, it achieves uniformity through assimilation, but here uni-
formity is achieved based on the agreed-upon rights.218 Even though the
introduction and continued use of a rights-based system in FDI allows for
the resolution of legal disputes, it remains insufficient to prevent divestment
because it does not provide the conflict management mechanisms to
strengthen the business relationship.219
Instead, for stakeholders to retain and expand investment, interest-
based systems220 that include processes such as negotiation, mediation, and
consensus-building221 are critical for strengthening the investor-State busi-
ness relationship. Generally, in an interest-based system, there is no winner
and no loser. Instead, if the parties have a conflict, they can either reach
210. Lebaron, supra note 164, at 6–7, 9–10, 14 (presenting the multidimensional nature of
culture: a lens, a medium, and a relationship).
211. Julia Ann Gold, ADR Through a Cultural Lens: How Cultural Values Shape Our Disput-
ing Processes, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 289, 295–301 (synthesizing the theories of Edward T. Hall
and Geert Hofsetede and suggesting the impact of cultural values on processes); see also DILYARA
NIGMATULLINA, COMBINING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION 21–22 (1st ed. 2018) (explaining the need for parties to specify their needs
when considering med-arb).
212. URY ET AL., supra note 58 and accompanying text.
213. FOLLETT, supra note 184, at 67–69, 75, 77, 79, 82, 84–86 (suggesting that we can address
conflict through domination, compromise, or integration).
214. URY ET AL., supra note 58, at 7–8.
215. For example, when there is a strike, the labor force imposes their values on company
management.
216. See Crespo, supra note 10, at 56–57.
217. URY ET AL., supra note 58, at 7.
218. Lon. L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 307–09,
325–27 (1971) (“[T]he judge orders the parties to conform themselves to the rules.” Id. at 308.).
219. Echandi & Gonstead, supra note 17, at 337–38.
220. URY ET AL., supra note 58, at 5–7.
221. BERNARD MAYER, STAYING WITH CONFLICT: A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO ONGOING DIS-
PUTES 119 (2009) (suggesting that it is necessary to broaden how we address conflict to also
include the possibility of “staying with it”).
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agreements that are mutually satisfying and more sustainable222 or search
for alternatives outside the bargaining table.223
This mindset of collaboration to resolve conflict requires a logic of
participation that goes beyond persuasion.224 Each party contributes some-
thing that is indispensable to the other. This is the concept of “power-
with,”225 where the “other” is considered an indispensable ally, instead of
“power-over,” where the “other” is a competitor at best and an enemy at
worst.226 Therefore, this interdependence227 requires a process that pro-
motes integration rather than assimilation.228 It is important to note that
when the dispute is the product of a clash of values, interest-based
processes may not be the best ones because the ultimate goal is to reach an
agreement. Generally, reaching an agreement is not the main objective with
issues regarding deeply held values.229
222. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 142, at 133–54.
223. FISHER ET AL., supra note 52, at 3–15, 42–81, 99–108.
224. See, e.g., Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cul-
tural Myths, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 55, 68–71 (describing the significant influence of dominant
narratives in the mediation process).
225. See BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT: A GUIDE TO ENGAGEMENT AND
INTERVENTION 65, 66–67 (2012) (“When we try to persuade others to change their behavior or
approach to a conflict, we are exercising power.”); Domènéc Melé & Josep M. Rosanas, Power,
Freedom and Authority in Management: Mary Parker Follett’s ‘Power-With,’ 3 PHIL. MGMT. 35,
38 (2003). See generally MARY PARKER FOLLETT, Power, in DYNAMIC ADMINISTRATION: THE
COLLECTED PAPERS OF MARY PARKER FOLLETT 72 (Henry C. Metcalf & L. Urwick eds., 2014)
(explaining power over and power with).
226. See generally GERZON, supra note 192 (distinguishing between leadership styles and sug-
gesting that we perceive others as either an enemy, a competitor, or an indispensable partner);
MAYER, supra note 225, at 111–92. For discussions on power-with, see Melé & Rosanas, supra
note 225.
227. COVEY, supra note 186, at 48–49 (explaining his “maturity continuum,” which begins
with dependence and moves toward independence and interdependence).
228. See, e.g., Laila Lalami, What Does It Take to ‘Assimilate’ in America?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/01/magazine/what-does-it-take-to-assimilate-
in-america.html (“For some, assimilation is based on pragmatic considerations, like achieving
some fluency in the dominant language, some educational or economic success, some familiarity
with the country’s history and culture. For others, it runs deeper and involves relinquishing all
ties, even linguistic ones, to the old country. For yet others, the whole idea of assimilation is
wrongheaded, and integration—a dynamic process that retains the connotation of individuality—
is seen as the better model. Think salad bowl, rather than melting pot: Each ingredient keeps its
flavor, even as it mixes with others.”).
229. Susskind, supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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Processes that promote integration230 lead to unity,231 not uniform-
ity.232 Through unity, the integration of both parties’ contributions can lead
to higher levels of innovation and growth. This is particularly relevant to
the types of investment where there is less incentive to conform233 to the
culture of the host country because of high levels of competition, such as
efficiency-seeking investment.
Therefore, when selecting or designing processes for the conflict at
hand, it is indispensable to keep in mind the cultural implications.234 The
process may lead to uniformity through assimilation or unity through inte-
gration. If the goal is to ensure adhesion to treaty rights, then adjudicative
processes or hybrids that promote uniformity and include characteristics
that follow the logic of persuasion would be preferable. If the goal is to
problem-solve conflict and unlock the potential of the relationship, then
facilitative processes or hybrids that promote unity and include characteris-
tics that follow the logic of participation would be preferable.
3. Assessing and Improving Systems: Tools to Examine What
Exists and Design What Could Be in Conflict Management
and Shared Decision-Making
At a systemic level, intercultural capacity requires frameworks for as-
sessment and improvement of the current systems in place. Without
frameworks for analysis, processes cannot function as an integral part of the
whole. This section describes two analytical frameworks: (1) the analytical
framework used in the field of Dispute System Design (DSD), which is
used for conflict resolution,235 and (2) Shared Decisions System Design
230. TROMPENAARS & HAMPDEN-TURNER, supra note 61, at 205 (“Once we are aware of our
mental models and cultural predispositions, and can respect and understand that those of another
culture are legitimately different, then it becomes possible to reconcile differences.”).
231. COVEY, supra note 186, at 318 (discussing that achieving unity is the “highest and best”
experience and disunity is a “bitter and lonely” experience); see also FOLLETT, supra note 225, at
71–94 (explaining integrative unity in business). “Business cannot serve its maximum degree of
usefulness to the community, cannot perform the service which it has, tacitly, bound itself to
perform, unless it seeks an enlarged understanding of the practical methods of unifying business
organization.” Id. at 71; LEBARON & PILLAY, supra note 130, at 3 (“[W]e remember that unity is
not uniformity or sameness, but harmony in the midst of diversity. Since diversity involves differ-
ences and some of those differences bring us into conflict, our shared goal is not the elimination of
conflict, but finding ways to live well with it.”).
232. Fuller, supra note 218, at 308 (“[M]ediation is commonly directed, not toward achieving
conformity to norms, but toward the creation of the relevant norms themselves.”).
233. See, e.g., Brook K. Baker, Traditional Issues of Professional Responsibility and a Trans-
formative Ethic of Client Empowerment for Legal Discourse, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 809, 880
(explaining that assimilation leads people to “shed their culture of origin” and “replace[ ] their . . .
ethnic identities [with] a [new] identity”).
234. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Exporting and Importing ADR: “I’ve Looked at Life from Both
Sides Now,” 12 DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2006, at 5, 5–7 (distinguishing between shaping cul-
ture and competency).
235. See generally URY ET AL., supra note 58; CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES
MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (1996); NANCY H. ROGERS, ROBERT C.
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(SDSD), the analytical framework previously mentioned as part of conflict
management mechanisms (CMMs) that is used to analyze current systems
of decision-making. Having a framework that recognizes culture as a trans-
versal factor to assess how conflicts and decisions are currently resolved
and made, and how they could be better resolved and made, can have a
significant impact in optimizing problem-solving within the investor-State
business relationship.
i. Dispute System Design (DSD): An Analytical Framework
for Intercultural Conflict Resolution Systems
Experts in the dispute resolution field have defined DSD as “the ap-
plied art and science of designing the means to prevent, manage, learn from,
and resolve streams of dispute or conflict.”236 They have also suggested that
the analytical framework examines six elements: (1) the goals of the sys-
tem; (2) its stakeholders; (3) the context and culture; (4) processes and
structures; (5) resources; and (6) how to determine success, accountability,
and learning.237
The spectrum of processes for conflict resolution examined in the pre-
vious section are considered the building blocks for designing systems for
conflict resolution.238 The main difference with the previous section is that
DSD focuses on, as the definition states, streams of conflicts instead of just
a single conflict.239 In this regard, the framework for system design ex-
plores how conflicts are resolved between different stakeholders, and what
can be done to better meet the goals of the system.240
As I have previously stressed,
DSD can be a powerful tool for analysis, reform, and reconceptu-
alization of old systems. It provides the lenses to challenge the
current systems and the roles stakeholders and experts are play-
ing. Furthermore, its participatory framework allows the old sys-
tems to be transformed through inclusive procedures.241
For stakeholders to maximize the potential of the DSD analytical frame-
work, it is important to emphasize its participatory nature when assessing
BORDONE, FRANK E.A. SANDER & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR
MANAGING DISPUTES (2013); AMSLER ET AL., supra note 196.
236. AMSLER ET AL., supra note 196, at 7–21.
237. Id. at 22–38.
238. Id. at 39–60.
239. See id. at 7–21.
240. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 235, at 1–10, 16–41; Mariana Hernandez Crespo G.,
Introduction to the Symposium: Leveraging on Disruption: The Potential of Dispute System De-
sign for Justice, Accountability, and Impact in Our Global Economy, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 159
(2017).
241. Crespo G., supra note 240, at 167.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-2\UST204.txt unknown Seq: 42  8-JUN-21 9:46
292 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:2
and designing systems for conflict resolution.242 Without the participation
of stakeholders, a system is unlikely to have the same effectiveness that
comes from having ownership of the final outcome.243 When systems for
conflict resolution are optimized, they may prevent conflict escalation,
lessen disruption, and ultimately enhance the interactions of the different
stakeholders. Conflict is inevitable, but it also creates opportunities, and
because of that, it is critical to have systems in place that mitigate risks and
attempt to optimize resolution.244
As in process selection or design, culture plays a critical role in the
DSD framework because values are at the core of culture, and the process
selection or design reflects a specific set of values. When designing a sys-
tem, the impact of culture is more prevalent because its impact is not lim-
ited to the resolution of a single conflict, rather culture affects an entire
system that will be implemented and used to resolve conflicts until the sys-
tem is reassessed.245
Therefore, it is indispensable to make informed decisions as to the cul-
tural implications of the processes that will be integral components of the
conflict resolution system design.246 Failure to do so may result in missed
opportunities for higher levels of cultural integration, and higher risk of
dissatisfaction and disengagement since the process may not align with
stakeholders’ values. This is relevant to the FDI investor-State relationship
because instead of using conflict to strengthen the relationship, the conflict
resolution system could resolve the conflict but erode the relationship.
ii. Shared Decisions System Design (SDSD): An Analytical
Framework for Intercultural Shared Decision-Making
Systems
In any long-term relationship,247 and especially in an investor-State
business relationship, the appropriate level of decision-making not only can
have a significant impact on the effectiveness and efficiency in accomplish-
242. See CONSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 235, at 49–67 (discussing the critical impor-
tance of stakeholders’ engagement).
243. See URY ET AL., supra note 58, at 65–83; see also AMSLER ET AL., supra note 196, at
29–30; CONSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 235, at 49–66; ROGERS ET AL., supra note 235, at
145–77.
244. CONSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 235, at xiii (“Conflict is like water: too much
causes damage to people and property, too little creates a dry, barren landscape devoid of life and
color.”).
245. See Gonstead, supra note 16, at 2226 (“Unlike ADR, which generally focuses on a single
dispute, similar to a static picture, DSD and SDSD, given their systemic nature, can assist in
managing conflict and making decisions on an ongoing basis, similar to a motion picture. This is
critically important when the parties share any kind of ongoing relationship.”).
246. GERZON, supra note 192, at 61–79 (arguing the importance of integral vision).
247. I first introduced this analytical framework in my keynote address at the 2016 Seoul
International Conference on Public Conflict, where I discussed the potential not only for FDI but
also for densely populated cities such as Seoul.
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ing goals248 but also can strengthen the relationship249—potentially leading
to investment retention and expansion.250 To this end, SDSD251 provides a
value-based analytical framework for leaders or partners to examine the op-
timal level of engagement with regard to who makes decisions, what deci-
sions are made, and how they are made.252 It is not enough to have a shared
vision. The path to achieve it requires a significant number of decisions—
such as deciding how the decisions are to be made, who gets to participate,
and in what capacity—which can be influential factors in failure or
success.253
The ultimate goal of this analytical framework is to help stakeholders
make informed decisions about decision-making itself. The framework is
made up of six elements: (1) participants: who should participate; (2) de-
gree of participation: information, consultation, shared decision-making; (3)
procedural options: persuasive or participatory processes; (4) organizational
area and level: in what area of the business and at what level; (5) goals and
procedures: what procedures should be used to execute the organizational
goals; and (6) timing: when to make the organizational decisions.254
This is a value-based analytical framework because the prerequisite to
making each of these determinations is an assessment of the parties’ val-
ues.255 Values, as stated previously, are at the core of culture and also at the
core of our individual identities. They drive decision-making and act as a
compass to provide a sense of direction that we use to prioritize among
possible options.256 Therefore, when parties come from different cultures,
understanding their underlying values is of critical importance to synchro-
nize shared decision-making.
Through value-based assessments, we can determine who cares about
the issue at hand. Those who care need to be involved in the decision-
248. COVEY, supra note 186, at 262 (arguing that engaging differences can produce
synergies).
249. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions in International and
Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts, 2003 J. DISP.
RESOL. 319, 344 (emphasizing that we should “develop more sophisticated theories about relation-
ships”). See generally FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE WORK AND LEGACY
OF WALLACE WARFIELD (Alicia Pfund ed., 2013); Wallace Warfield, Public Policy Conflict Reso-
lution: The Nexus Between Culture and Process, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE: INTEGRATION AND APPLICATION 176, 176–93 (Dennis J.D. Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe
eds., 1993). I conceptualized SDSD building on the work of Wallace Warfield, who emphasized
the need to pay attention to culture, relationships, and decision-making.
250. See generally Crespo G., supra note 6.
251. See Echandi & Gonstead, supra note 17, at 337–38. See generally Gonstead, supra note
16.
252. See Thomas H. Davenport, Make Better Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 2009), https:/
/hbr.org/2009/11/make-better-decisions-2 (“Organizations need to give managers the tools and as-
sistance to ‘decide how to decide’ on an ongoing basis.”).
253. Gonstead, supra note 16, at 2227–33.
254. Id.
255. Gonstead, supra note 18, at 716–23.
256. Id.
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making process to some degree.257 The degree of participation has to be
aligned with the degree of significance of the matter for those involved.258
If a matter is less significant to a party, that party might only need to be
informed or consulted.259 In consultation and information sharing there is a
solo decision-maker. The primary difference between consultation and in-
formation sharing is that in consultation, others have a voice, while in infor-
mation sharing, they are simply being informed.260 In contrast, if the matter
is of high significance, it would be critical to consider sharing decision-
making power. In this case, being informed or consulted might not be
enough to truly maximize the level of engagement required for effective
interactions.261
It is also necessary to consider whether the decision-making process
will be based on persuasion or participation.262 Persuasion-based processes
such as voting, in which there must be a winner, lead to the exclusion of the
options proposed by those who lost.263 Participation-based processes such
as interest-based negotiation, mediation, and consensus building lead to in-
clusion as they integrate interests and values into mutually satisfying
agreements.264
Finally, when a decision could affect more than those directly involved
(systemic decision-making), it is important to take into account the specific
area and level of an organization,265 as well as goals, procedures, and tim-
ing.266 Even though some degree of inclusion of those who care about a
decision could be perceived as less efficient and effective than solo deci-
sion-making, failure to include those for whom the matter is highly signifi-
cant can produce high levels of dissatisfaction, disengagement, and
257. See SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 142, at 41–60. See generally David Laws,
Representation of Stakeholding Interests, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPRE-
HENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 241, 241–85 (Lawrence E. Susskind et al. eds., 1st ed.
1999) (discussing the importance of who is at the table).
258. See ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS YOU NE-
GOTIATE 87–89 (2006) (explaining the degree of participation with three levels that affect the core
concern of autonomy: inform, consult then decide, and negotiate joint agreements).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 72–95.
261. Id. at 87–89.
262. See Lawrence Susskind, An Alternative to “Robert’s Rules of Order” for Groups, Orga-
nizations, and Ad Hoc Assemblies That Want to Operate by Consensus, in THE CONSENSUS BUILD-
ING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 3, 3–13, 20–35, 55–56
(Lawrence E. Susskind et al. eds., 1st ed. 1999) (explaining that in collective decision-making, the
procedures adopted could be based on persuasion, such as Robert’s Rules of Order, or they could
be based on participation, such as consensus building).
263. Id. at 3–17 (arguing that with Robert’s Rules of Order, “majority rules”).
264. See generally id. at 133–53 (discussing “nearly self-enforcing agreements”).
265. See generally Ron Carucci, How Systems Support (or Undermine) Good Decision-Mak-
ing, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 4, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/02/how-systems-support-or-undermine-
good-decision-making (discussing that despite robust scholarship regarding decision-making,
there is still discrepancy regarding organizational level decision-making).
266. See generally Gonstead, supra note 16, at 2233–34.
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disruption.267 Therefore, to minimize risk and maximize potential, stake-
holders must have a culturally informed analytical framework that is
grounded in values when crafting a system for decision-making.
IV. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: CONNECTING THE GOAL AND THE
STRATEGY TO MINIMIZE RISK & MAXIMIZE POTENTIAL IN
INVESTOR-STATE BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
This article argued that if we broaden the goals, from securing invest-
ment to strengthening the investor-State business relationship, then we can
maximize the potential for investment retention and expansion. If we aim to
move forward, we must develop new strategies that help foreign investors
and host countries interact more effectively with each other at the domestic
level. In this way, it will be possible to capitalize on differences and address
conflicts before they escalate into legal disputes.
Conflicts can be resolved through the assertion of power, rights, or
interests. Historically, we have experienced the damaging effect of relying
mainly on the exercise of power. Currently, we have systems in place to
enforce rights when there is an abuse of power or noncompliance with
treaty terms. It is time to further explore how conflict can be resolved in a
way that incorporates the parties’ values and aims to satisfy the interests of
the parties at the table and those affected by the agreement at the domestic
level.
As has been well established in the dispute resolution field, conflict is
inevitable. The question is not whether there will be conflict but when, and
how it will be resolved. Therefore, to strengthen the investor-State relation-
ship, minimize risk, and maximize potential, stakeholders must have sys-
tems in place to manage conflict before it escalates and becomes a legal
dispute.
To effectively use differences and address conflict at the domestic
level, this article suggests innovative strategies to identify cultural chal-
lenges. Cultural challenges vary depending on the type of investment. For
example, natural resource-seeking investment may require cultural under-
standing of the local community, and market-seeking investment generally
requires a broader understanding of the domestic target market. Efficiency-
seeking investment generally requires an alignment of global standards and
the domestic culture, and strategic asset-seeking investment generally re-
quires the integration of corporate and domestic cultures. Therefore, it is
imperative to consider and understand the impact of culture on the specific
type of investment.
267. See generally Susskind, supra note 262, at 3–13, 20–35, 55–56 (discussing the benefits
of shared decision-making through consensus building, rather than persuasion-based processes
such as Robert’s Rules of Order).
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To address these cultural challenges, this article argued that it is neces-
sary to have a framework for conflict management, and the intercultural
capacities necessary to optimize the interactions between foreign investors
and host countries, thereby enhancing engagement, understanding, and pre-
dictability. These capacities include tools to enhance interactions at the bar-
gaining table in processes such as negotiation, mediation, and consensus
building. They also include tools to select or design processes for when
conflict erupts. Finally, they include tools to assess and improve systems for
conflict management and shared decision-making.
When we are operating in a partnership, sharing a vision is not enough
to navigate the daily interactions of the stakeholders. To enter into a busi-
ness relationship without systems for conflict management and shared deci-
sion-making not only is a huge risk but also leaves a lot of potential value at
the table.
The framework for conflict management and shared decision-making,
as well as the intercultural capacities required to maximize the potential of
the relationship, can be developed over time both at home and at work. It is
unlikely that stakeholder representatives will be able to handle the most
complex types of negotiations and conflict with those with whom they have
very little in common unless they have trained the participatory muscle on a
daily basis with those with whom they share daily life.268 Unless investors
and States start seeing each other as indispensable partners, the world may
never reach the new levels of innovation and growth that can be achieved
by working together, unlocking the full potential of their business
relationship.
268. Gonstead, supra note 16, at 2214.
